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CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 1720
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms,
and anthro-pomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations,
which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically
and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical,
and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one
has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn
out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.
1
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche

INTRODUCTION

P

OPULAR thought divides constitutional adjudication into two
categories. Either judges are faithfully and directly enforcing
the Constitution as written, or they basically are making it up as
they go along, creating rules with no roots in the Constitution and
imposing them on the rest of society.2 People can be excused for
subscribing to this dichotomous vision; Supreme Court Justices
have pressed it on them. In his eloquent dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice Scalia lamented that the Court had strayed from its proper role, the “essentially lawyers’ work” of “ascertaining an objective law.”3 Half a
century before him, Justice Owen Roberts described the judicial
task as similarly straightforward: The Court’s function, he wrote,
1

Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, in The Portable
Nietzsche 42, 46–47 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Penguin Books 1976) (1954).
2
Like many other concepts, the dichotomy between legitimate enforcement and illegitimate judicial legislation finds its most strident articulation in political rhetoric
and the popular press. Statements by elected officials excoriating so-called “activist
judges” are a dime a dozen. For a notable one, see the statement of President Bush
endorsing the Federal Marriage Amendment. Press Release, George W. Bush, Statement by the President (May 17, 2004),www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/
print/20040517-2.html (“The sacred institution of marriage should not be redefined by
a few activist judges.”). In the popular press, the most striking recent example is Mark
R. Levin, Men in Black: How the Supreme Court Is Destroying America (2005). Academic commentary tends to recognize that “activist” is an epithet with no substantive
content. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1401, 1401 (2002).
3
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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was merely “to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked
beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former.”4
Academics are less tempted by what I will call the fallacy of direct enforcement. They understand that courts deciding constitutional cases apply a vast body of doctrine that contains complexities and distinctions well beyond those of the constitutional text.
But scholars and Justices alike frequently fall prey to a related and
more insidious lure, which I will call the fallacy of perfect enforcement. The fallacy of perfect enforcement assumes that doctrinal
rules are simply a way of getting the right answers in constitutional
cases. The meaning of the Constitution, on this understanding, is
precisely and exhaustively specified by actual or hypothetical adjudicative outcomes: A governmental action is constitutionally sound
if and only if a court would uphold it, and unconstitutional if and
only if a court would strike it down.5
My purpose in this Article is twofold. First, in Part I, I will show
that both direct enforcement and perfect enforcement are illusory.
Judges never have done either of them, and for good reason. In
place of these two spurious alternatives, Parts II and III will present a model that describes what judges actually do in constitutional cases: create and apply rules that do not simply articulate the
demands of the Constitution but are shaped by a wide variety of
factors and, in some cases, direct outcomes inconsistent with constitutional requirements. The debunking of the enforcement fallacies and the development of the alternative model will be fairly
straightforward; indeed, in one form or another, the model is
widely accepted. But this model often is forgotten, and the second
and more novel thing this Article will do is to put the descriptive
account to normative work. Part IV will analyze the rules created
4

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
The idea that statements about law are a shorthand for the predicted outcomes of
adjudication is associated with a form of legal realism—the predictive theory of law.
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 173
(1920) (asserting that statements about law are “prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact”). That theory has, of course, been criticized on philosophical grounds. See,
e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 1–3 (2d ed. 1994). This Article will offer a
criticism of the theory as it applies to constitutional law, but my method is not jurisprudential. Rather, my basic claim is that an unthinking equation of constitutional
meaning with the outcome of adjudication warps doctrine in certain predictable ways.
5
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in a number of doctrinal areas, and Part V will discuss some of the
difficulties that the Court faces in creating and maintaining its doctrinal rules. Part VI will demonstrate a mistake that has not yet
been systematically studied: the mistake of succumbing to the fallacy of perfect enforcement. In a striking number of cases the
Court has forgotten the reasons behind particular rules and has
come to treat them as nothing more than statements of constitutional requirements. This mistaken equation of judicial doctrine
and constitutional command tends to warp doctrine, frequently at
significant cost to constitutional values; it also distorts the relationship the Court has to other governmental actors and to the American people.
I. THE ENFORCEMENT FALLACIES
The fallacy of direct enforcement requires little discussion;
judges and scholars have frequently noted that there is a distinction
between the Constitution itself and the rules that courts apply in
deciding cases. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Graves v. New
York ex rel. O’Keefe, noted the tendency to “encrust” the Constitution with doctrine and “thereafter to consider merely what has
been judicially said.”6 Likewise, then-Professor Hans Linde observed “It is natural that judge-made formulas, once pronounced,
take on a life independent of their supposed sources in the Constitution, and that the application of these judicial formulas should
become the daily rule in constitutional litigation and their reexamination the exception.”7
In these formulations, however, the implicit assumption is the
fallacy of perfect enforcement: that doctrine is and should be a
means to the end of reaching correct decisions—and, more significantly, that judicial decisions are correct according to the court’s
interpretation of the Constitution.8 In contrast to the eminently resistible siren of direct enforcement, perfect enforcement probably
will not strike most readers as immediately problematic. After all,
6

306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 197–98 (1976).
8
I add the qualifying phrase to make clear that the perfect enforcement fallacy does
not require the assumption that courts are in fact correct in their interpretation of the
Constitution. The point is simply about the relationship between the outcome of a
case and what the court believes the Constitution requires or prohibits.
7
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courts uphold constitutional laws and strike down unconstitutional
ones—don’t they?
Indeed they do—in much the same way, and to much the same
extent, as they acquit innocent people and convict guilty ones.
Which is to say, with something considerably less than perfect accuracy, and deliberately so. In the criminal context, it is commonplace to distinguish between legal and factual guilt. Acquittal does
not mean that the defendant did not commit the offense; it means
that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. The possibility remains that the defendant is in fact guilty.
Legal rulings may not track the underlying facts perfectly.
A similar divergence between ruling and reality can occur even
with issues that seem purely legal, for constitutional questions
“frequently turn in the last analysis on questions of fact.”9 Consider
the substantial effects test of Commerce Clause jurisprudence:
Congress may regulate activities—at least commercial activities—
that in the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce.10 But
the primary responsibility for deciding whether a substantial effect
exists lies not with the courts but with Congress. Judicial review of
a congressional determination that such an effect exists is deferential: Courts ask not whether the substantial effect exists, but
whether Congress rationally could have believed it to. In consequence, much like a court applying the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard in a criminal case, a court reviewing Commerce
Clause legislation under the rational basis “substantial effects” test
will regularly and predictably uphold regulation of activities that
do not, in fact, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The rational basis standard of review underenforces the underlying
constitutional rule (what I will call, following Professor Mitchell
Berman, the “constitutional operative proposition”11). Unconstitutional laws will be upheld, and the outcome of adjudication will not
reflect the true meaning of the Constitution.
An objection presents itself: Perhaps this simply shows that ra9

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 246 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in the judgment in part).
10
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–10 (2000) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–60 (1995)).
11
See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2004)
[hereinafter Berman, Decision Rules].
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tional basis is part of the meaning of the Constitution. From our
current Court-centered perspective, the claim might seem plausible. Adopting the perspective of Congress demonstrates that it is
not. A conscientious legislator, aware of judicial doctrine, will
know that the Court will uphold regulation of any commercial activity that might rationally be believed, in the aggregate, to substantially affect interstate commerce. But in deciding whether a
vote in favor of a proposed law is consistent with her oath to uphold the Constitution, should she ask herself whether she might rationally believe the aggregated activity has such a substantial effect? Surely she should ask instead whether she does believe this.
That is, it would not be an act of good constitutional faith to vote in
favor of a law regulating an activity she did not believe substantially affected interstate commerce on the grounds that the contrary view would be rational.12
The matter becomes even clearer if we return to the criminal
context. There, a person contemplating murder will know he will
not be convicted unless he commits the crime in such a manner as
to allow proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet not even the most
hardened realist would suggest that the criminal law forbids only
those crimes that leave sufficient evidence to convict. The law prohibits murder tout court; the perfect crime is still a crime. Thus, the
rules that courts apply (convict if all elements are proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; strike down if Congress could not rationally
have found a substantial effect on interstate commerce) are not the
same as the rules that actors seeking to comply with the law should
consider. They are not the true law.
12

Thus, as James Bradley Thayer put it, citing Cooley:
[O]ne who is a member of a legislature may vote against a measure as being, in
his judgment, unconstitutional; and, being subsequently placed on the bench,
when this measure, having been passed by the legislature in spite of his opposition, comes before him judicially, may there find it his duty, although he has in
no degree changed his opinion, to declare it constitutional.
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893) (citing Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of
the American Union 68 (6th ed. Little, Brown 1890) (1868)). “[T]he ultimate question,” Thayer asserted, “is not what is the true meaning of the constitution, but
whether legislation is sustainable or not.” Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted). For a modern
statement, see Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975).
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In the context of the Commerce Clause, the constitutional operative proposition might be (and I shall assume here that it is) the
substantial effects test.13 The rational basis standard of review, like
a burden of proof, is designed to guide judicial decisionmaking.
“Strike down if Congress could not rationally have found a substantial effect on interstate commerce” is what I will call (again following Professor Mitchell Berman) a “constitutional decision
rule.”14
This Article seeks to demonstrate just how many doctrinal areas
profitably may be understood from the perspective that separates
decision rules from constitutional operative propositions. Not all of
the demonstrations will be as clear-cut as the analysis of rational
basis review in the context of the Commerce Clause.15 There is
room for disagreement about the status of particular doctrinal formulations—whether they are constitutional operative propositions
or decision rules—and about the content of the constitutional operative propositions themselves. But those are questions about the
application of the model, not its basic validity. I will first develop
the model in more detail, then use it to analyze and critique several
areas of doctrine.
II. THE DECISION RULES MODEL
Thus far I have argued that the rules courts apply in deciding
constitutional cases do not necessarily reflect the underlying meaning of the Constitution. To say that doctrine may diverge from the
Constitution may not be to say anything more than that the Court
gets some cases wrong.16 The insight of the decision rules model is
different. It is that the Court intentionally crafts decision rules that
depart, in some cases quite substantially, from its understanding of
13
I will discuss the operative proposition underlying the Commerce Clause in
greater detail in Section IV.B.
14
See Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 9.
15
Indeed, I admit that even the operative proposition of the Commerce Clause may
be hard to discern. My claim here is only that the rational basis standard of review is
not part of it.
16
In his Harvard Law Review foreword, Professor Akhil Amar pursued essentially
this claim, comparing the outcome of cases under the Court’s doctrine to the outcomes suggested by constitutional text and structure and finding the latter more appealing. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 26–27 (2000).
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constitutional operative propositions. The Court prescribes doctrinal rules that predictably lead to adjudicative outcomes that are
erroneous in terms of its understanding of the actual meaning of
the Constitution.
This is not necessarily a criticism of the Court. As I will explain
in Part III, there are good reasons to do so. Nor is it a novel insight.
Professor James Bradley Thayer, arguing for judicial restraint in
1893, well understood that he was advocating a “rule of administration” under which some unconstitutional laws would be upheld.17
The Court should strike down only manifest violations of the Constitution, he argued, because Congress has “primary authority to
interpret.”18 In modern times, the germinal moment of the idea is
Professor Lawrence Sager’s article Fair Measure: The Legal Status
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms.19 Professor Sager argued
that the Court underenforced some constitutional operative propositions—in particular, equal protection—but that other actors
should understand themselves as bound to the full extent of the
operative proposition.20
The distinction between the perspective of courts deciding cases
and other actors attempting to understand their constitutional obligations bears an obvious relation to Professor Meir Dan-Cohen’s
account of a similar divergence in criminal law, between what he
called “conduct rules” and “decision rules.”21 The connection to the
17

Thayer, supra note 12, at 139–44.
Id. at 136. The idea is ancient, according to Thayer, who did not see himself as articulating anything new. Id. at 140. In Fletcher v. Peck, for example, Chief Justice
Marshall noted that a Court that believed a law was unconstitutional should nonetheless strike it down only if “[t]he opposition between the constitution and the law
[were] such that the judge [felt] a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility
with each other.” 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).
19
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213–15 (1978); see also Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 107–08 (1976).
20
Sager, supra note 19, at 1221.
21
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 627–28 (1984). Professor Dan-Cohen’s main suggestion was that it was desirable in many cases for actors to believe that they were
bound by norms (conduct rules) different in material ways from those the courts
would apply (decision rules). Id. My point in this Article is similar, though in some
ways the converse: courts and other actors over time regularly come to confuse the
decision rules with the conduct rules (what I call constitutional operative propositions). This is undesirable, for a number of reasons. See infra Section VI.
18
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constitutional context was made explicitly by Professor Akhil
Amar22 and emphatically by Professor Mitchell Berman, whose
Constitutional Decision Rules offers the decision rules model as a
general account of constitutional law.23 Professor Berman’s article
in many ways constitutes the starting point for this one, which attempts to use the model to offer a more broad-ranging normative
critique of existing doctrine, and in particular to highlight the characteristic error that occurs when the Court loses sight of the distinction.
The model can be simply stated. The Constitution contains certain rules that empower or restrain actors—these are the constitutional operative propositions. In deciding constitutional cases, the
Supreme Court is called upon to determine whether a power has
been exceeded or a restraint violated. To do this, it first decides
what the constitutional operative proposition is. In some cases this
will be easy—for instance, the requirement that Senators be at
least thirty years old. In others, it will be harder—enforcing the
demand that no state deny any person the equal protection of the
laws requires the Court to decide what “equal protection” means.
In the difficult cases, the constitutional operative proposition will
not be identical to the text; it will be a more general principle such
as “the government may not treat some people worse than others
without adequate justification.”24
Second, the Court adopts a decision rule to implement the operative proposition. One possibility would be a decision rule that
22

Amar, supra note 16, at 48 n.67 (citing Dan-Cohen, supra note 21, at 625).
Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 8–10. For another notable contribution
in a similar vein, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution
(2001). Professor Fallon notes that the Court does not, as it has sometimes claimed to
do, simply lay a statute next to the Constitution to see whether the statute is sound.
Rather, it “devises and then implicates strategies for enforcing constitutional values,”
which “do not (and should not) always reflect the Court’s direct assessment of constitutional meaning.” Id. at 5–6. Professors Fallon, Berman, and Sager deserve credit for
offering the model as a fairly general account of constitutional adjudication. Fallon,
supra, at 5–6; Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 8–10; Sager, supra note 19, at
1213–14. I attempt here to extend their insight by offering a more wide-ranging normative critique of doctrine and an explicit consideration of the problem of time.
24
Similar phrasings abound. Professor Berman offers the proposition that “government may not classify individuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state interest.” Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 9. Sager suggests
the formulation that “[a] state may treat persons differently only when it is fair to do
so.” Sager, supra note 19, at 1215.
23
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closely tracks the operative proposition. Such a decision rule would
not amount to direct enforcement, for the Court still would have to
select and assign a burden of proof. A decision rule modeled on the
operative proposition and containing a more-likely-than-not burden of proof is perhaps the closest the Court could come to perfect
enforcement. Applying that decision rule to particular cases will
produce precedents that flesh out the underlying operative proposition, specifying, for instance, what does or does not constitute an
adequate justification for a particular classification. A substantial
amount of constitutional adjudication consists of this sort of common law-style development. But the Court also might choose decision rules that differ substantially from the operative propositions
they are intended to implement.25 In such circumstances, the outcomes of adjudication under the decision rule will differ from outcomes under the operative proposition. Why the Court might
choose such a rule is the subject of the next Part.
III. CONSTRUCTING DECISION RULES: THE FACTORS IN PLAY
Adopting a rule that predictably produces erroneous results
might seem odd at first blush. Surely, one might think, the Court’s
first (and perhaps only) obligation is to enforce the Constitution’s
operative propositions. Why should it try to do anything else?
One answer is that decision rules are unavoidable—and not just
because general propositions do not decide concrete cases. A court
must give structure to the adjudicatory process; it must determine
and assign burdens of proof, production, and persuasion.26 Still, the
necessities of adjudication alone do not explain why the Court
might choose a decision rule that departs substantially from the
operative proposition.
The answer here is more complex. A number of factors might
make the Court decide to adopt a decision rule that varies significantly from the constitutional operative proposition. In what fol-

25
As Berman puts it, “[n]onstandard decision rules are standard fare.” Mitchell N.
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 833 (2005) [hereinafter
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering].
26
See Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 93–99 (discussing different burdens
of proof and when they should be used).
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lows, I set out a non-exhaustive list.27 None of the factors is likely
by itself to provide a complete explanation of a particular decision
rule, and they may point in different directions. The value of an
explicit analysis of the factors is that by articulating what considerations drive the creation of a particular decision rule, we get a
better sense of its purpose and therefore a greater ability to analyze its wisdom and efficacy. The factors on which I focus are those
I see at work in the doctrinal areas discussed in subsequent Parts.
A. Institutional Competence
Institutional competence could be a general answer, subsuming
many of the other factors I will consider below. Here I use it in a
narrow sense—getting the right answer to a particular question.
Judges are good at answering some questions, and legislatures are
good at answering others. What questions fall within the respective
competences of the judiciary and the legislature is a matter on
which there is far less agreement. Judges might be particularly
good at interpreting legal documents or at construing constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary.28 Classical legal thought
took them as experts in classification—in determining whether an
activity was commerce or manufacture, for instance, or whether a
business was affected with a public interest.29 It has been suggested
that they have some advantage in determining America’s fundamental values,30 though this proposition also has been attacked

27
For a different analysis of factors guiding the creation of decision rules, see Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 92–96.
28
This latter point is one element of a weak reading of Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). See Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great”
Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1111, 1120–21 (2001).
29
See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960:
The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 27–30 (1992); William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of
Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937, at 4–6, 90 (1998);
Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, in 3 Res. L. & Soc. 3, 3–9
(Rita J. Simon ed., 1980).
30
See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics 24–27 (2d ed. 1986) (“[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing
with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess. . . . This is
crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society . . . .”).
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forcefully31 and seems to have fallen from favor. They may be
poorly suited to gauge the necessities of administration in unusual
environments such as prisons.32 It also is generally conceded that
they are less able to resolve complicated factual questions, such as
the economic effects of a particular law.33
If a constitutional operative proposition sets up a question that is
within the peculiar competence of courts, then the Court might decide to adopt a decision rule that closely tracks the operative
proposition and grants no deference to other actors. If the question
falls within the legislative competence, the Court may respond in
one of several ways. It might nonetheless mold its decision rule
closely to the operative proposition and refuse to defer. This could
be simple obstinacy—if the legislature is substantially more capable of discerning the right answer, then correct outcomes will likely
be maximized by simply accepting the legislative judgment—but
there might be reasons to do so. Such reasons will typically be one
or more of the factors discussed in the following subsections, which
on their own or in combination might outweigh a lack of superior
institutional competence.
Alternatively, a court confronting a question within the legislative competence might craft a deferential rule—such as the rational
basis test—that will tend to uphold almost all legislative acts, even
those that the judges would deem unconstitutional if not defer-

31
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The people know that their
value judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law school—maybe better.”).
32
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987) (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.”).
33
As Justice Jackson wrote in a letter to then-Circuit Judge Sherman Minton, “in
any case where Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate commerce, the Court
will accept that judgment. . . . When we admit that it is an economic matter, we pretty
nearly admit that it is not a matter which courts may judge.” Letter from Robert H.
Jackson to Sherman Minton (Dec. 21, 1942), 1–2, quoted in Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089, 1146
(2000); see also Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 156 (1997) (“[A] rigorous judicial examination of effects on commerce would entail making economic judgments of a kind
ill-suited to courts.”).
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ring.34 This is not, I hasten to add, equivalent to deferring to the
legislature’s interpretation of the Constitution. A deferential decision rule defers not to the legislature’s determination as to what
the relevant operative proposition is, but to its determination that a
law complies with that operative proposition.
Last, the court might adopt a decision rule that departs from the
operative proposition by substituting a question within the judicial
competence. This technique preserves judicial authority at some
cost to the underlying operative proposition. It will appeal to
courts enamored of judicial supremacy—the court may not be deciding the right question, but at least it is the court that is deciding.
B. Costs of Error
No court will get the right answer every time, even the Supreme
Court, which as Justice Jackson famously commented is not final
because it is infallible, but rather infallible only because it is final.35
Mistakes are inevitable, and they generally will come in one of two
forms: erroneously permitting an unconstitutional government action, and erroneously forbidding an action that is constitutionally
sound. The relative costs assigned to these different kinds of errors
will suggest deferential, non-deferential, or even anti-deferential
decision rules. That is, a court might underenforce an operative
proposition by adopting a rule that predictably upholds violations
but strikes down almost no valid acts. It might attempt simply to
enforce the proposition by adopting a rule that attempts to minimize the total number of errors without reference to kind. Or it
might overenforce by adopting a rule that predictably strikes down
valid laws but upholds almost no violations. Rational basis review,
I have suggested, is frequently an example of the first; strict scrutiny, I will argue, is frequently an example of the last.
One might attempt to do this cost-benefit analysis at the wholesale level. When a court erroneously upholds unconstitutional governmental action, some individual’s constitutional rights have
probably been violated—though frequently in a manner that the
34

This is precisely Thayer’s point: Judges should uphold laws they would have opposed on constitutional grounds as conscientious legislators. Thayer, supra note 12, at
144.
35
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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political process can correct.36 When it erroneously strikes down a
valid governmental act, the American people (for a federal act) or
some subgroup thereof (for a state act)37 have been denied the ability to govern themselves—and in a manner that will take a constitutional amendment, or a changed Court, to reverse. Both these
things are bad, of course, but those who find the latter worse than
the former will tend to support across-the-board calls for judicial
restraint.38 Conversely, those who feel the opposite will tend to call
for aggressive judicial supervision of the elected branches.
It makes a good deal more sense, however, to consider the matter at the retail level. Here one would proceed by identifying a
class of cases—usually those related to a particular constitutional
right, or a subset thereof. One would then assess the costs of error—things such as the harm to the individual, the importance of
the governmental interest likely to be thwarted, the ability of the
government to achieve its legitimate aims by other means—and
adopt a decision rule reflecting the relative costs of each kind of error. Cost-benefit analysis thus offers one explanation for strict
scrutiny: Judges look more closely at laws that inflict greater
36
That is, an unconstitutional law can always be repealed, and compensation paid
(though this is less likely) to those affected by it. “[T]he Constitution presumes that
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.”
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). An improvident
decision might not seem unconstitutional, of course. Indeed, one might think that is
the very reason that the Court does not strike it down. But if the Constitution contains some utility-maximizing rules—and I will argue it does—then improvident decisions indeed may violate the Constitution. The only question is whether courts should
enforce these rules, and the modern answer is that they should not.
37
The analysis might differ depending on whether the act under review is that of the
federal government or of a state. Professor Thayer argued that erroneously upholding
state legislation is more costly than erroneously upholding federal legislation, on the
grounds that the latter expands the authority of a co-ordinate branch, while the former expands the power of a subordinate state government at the cost of its federal
superior. Consequently, he urged less deferential review of state laws. Thayer, supra
note 12, at 154–55. Thus, this form of cost-benefit analysis was at least implicit in the
literature as far back as 1893.
38
They also might stay up late at night worrying about the countermajoritarian difficulty, which has always struck me as a little silly. If the Constitution contains judicially
enforceable restraints on legislative action, which everyone agrees it does, then the
majority sometimes will not get its way. But if the judicial decision is correct, observations about the countermajoritarian difficulty are really just complaints about the
relevant constitutional provision, rather than judicial review. Most invocations of the
difficulty are probably intended as something else; they are a shorthand expression—
but not an especially helpful one—of doubt that current judicial decisions are correct.
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harms.39
C. Frequency of Unconstitutional Action
Strict scrutiny also can be understood as serving quite a different
purpose, one that relates not so much to the cost of error as to the
likelihood of a constitutional violation. Some sorts of governmental
action may be identified by objective factors as highly likely to violate constitutional strictures, and courts are justified in applying
non-deferential, or even anti-deferential, decision rules to them.
That is, a court might justifiably overenforce a constitutional operative proposition on the grounds that certain kinds of governmental action may safely be presumed unconstitutional.
The obvious example comes from equal protection jurisprudence. Suppose that the Fourteenth Amendment simply means
more or less what it says: States cannot treat people differently
without an adequate justification. Almost all laws classify, and
many do so with little more justification than rewarding rentseeking on the part of various interest groups—something that
might well be deemed unconstitutional in terms of violating the
demand that legislators treat citizens with equal concern and respect. The question for courts is how to distinguish the classifications that require judicial intervention from those that may be left
to the political process. A court that attempted to police all rentseeking legislation would be overwhelmed; perhaps more seriously,
it would inevitably intrude deeply upon the prerogative of the legislature to make policy choices. Heuristics are needed, and an
awareness of history can drive the construction of decision rules.
The knowledge that certain kinds of classification frequently
have been used for illegitimate reasons, and seldom for legitimate
ones, would justify overenforcement of equal protection. The
39

See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 438–39 (1997) (describing cost-benefit and smoking-out understandings of strict scrutiny). The question remains, of course, of why courts are better positioned than legislatures to engage in
this balancing. A pure cost-benefit answer might be that the cost of allowing an unconstitutional exercise of power exceeds the cost of striking down a valid one, and
therefore the use of judicial review as a second screen for unconstitutional laws provides net benefits. See Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of
Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529, 1577 (2000) (describing the value of “multiple vetoes” to the protection of rights). Alternatively, one of the other factors discussed in
this Part might be at work.
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greater the ratio of illegitimate uses of a classification to valid ones,
the more efficient heightened scrutiny becomes. Laws that burden
the interests of racial minorities are the obvious example. Because
such laws have been used so frequently for improper purposes, a
decision rule that strikes down almost all such laws will invalidate
many unconstitutional laws and very few legitimate ones. For just
such reasons, the Court has reacted to the history and persistence
of racial discrimination by strictly scrutinizing such laws.40 Likewise,
in announcing heightened scrutiny for gender-based classifications
in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court referred explicitly to the
“long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”41
D. Legislative Pathologies
Another justification for an anti-deferential decision rule arises
when there is reason to doubt the good faith of the legislature. In a
well-functioning democracy, the legislature generally can be
trusted to balance the costs of a law against its benefits and to do
so more accurately than judges can. In an identifiable range of circumstances, however, the political process will fall victim to predictable malfunctions; the legislature’s incentives will not align with
the public interest. Laws that entrench legislators are the most obvious example. More generally, courts may identify cases in which
the benefits of a law accrue to a constituency to which the legislature is responsive while its burdens fall on a group with less voice.
A law that benefits locals while burdening out-of-staters is the
paradigm example, but one that benefits a politically powerful
group while burdening a weaker group presents essentially the
same problem. In such cases, there is reason to doubt the soundness of legislative decisionmaking. Even if the subject matter of the
decision falls within the legislative competence, courts may craft
non-deferential decision rules to deal with situations in which it
40

See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Our
jurisprudence ranks race a ‘suspect’ category, ‘not because [race] is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our national shame,
has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973) (noting “history of purposeful unequal treatment” as one criterion for suspect
class status).
41
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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appears the legislature may be engaged in self-dealing, or in distributing benefits to its powerful constituents. Deference is inappropriate where the legislature cannot offer an unbiased assessment of the situation.
This sort of justification for non-deferential decision rules is essentially the one championed by Professor John Hart Ely.42 It also
crops up in Supreme Court jurisprudence, such as the San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez43 criteria for suspect class
status and in the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products.44 More recently, it has been urged by Judge Guido
Calabresi and Professor Rebecca Brown.45
E. Enforcement Costs
Some constitutional operative propositions may require courts
to decide questions that they simply cannot, or that they cannot
without burdensome or intrusive evidence-gathering. That governmental acts cannot be based on personal hostility is a plausible
constitutional operative proposition, but plumbing the mind of the
governmental actor is costly and intrusive at the least, and perhaps
impossible, especially in the case of multi-member legislative bodies. Thus, a court may substitute a decision rule that turns on objective and easily ascertainable factors. As Professor Berman writes:
[W]henever the Court has rejected an invitation to directly inquire into a governmental actor’s purposes or reasons for action,
42
Combating legislative entrenchment is what Professor Ely refers to as “[c]learing
the [c]hannels of [p]olitical [c]hange.” John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review 105 (1980). Giving more searching review to laws that
benefit the politically powerful at the expense of the powerless is part of what he refers to as “[f]acilitating the [r]epresentation of [m]inorities.” Id. at 135. In this latter
context, Professor Ely distinguished between “‘first degree’ prejudice,” which leads
legislatures to discount the interests of powerless or unpopular minorities, and “misapprehension” prejudice, which leads legislatures to err in their assessments of the
impact or efficacy of laws. Id. at 153, 157. First degree prejudice relates to institutional
incentives; second degree “misapprehension” prejudice is an issue of institutional
competence in the narrow sense I have employed it.
43
411 U.S. at 28.
44
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
45
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term—Foreword: Antidiscrimination
and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105
Harv. L. Rev. 80, 90–93 (1991); Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1497 (2002).
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there is a chance that the resulting doctrine in fact reflects compound judgments: first, that the true constitutional meaning does
turn upon the actor’s purposes, and second, that such meaning is
best administered via a decision rule that conclusively presumes
the absence (or presence) of such purposes under specified cir46
cumstances.

Constitutional criminal procedure offers another example. Indigent defendants are entitled to appellate representation roughly
equivalent to that of those who can afford lawyers. But no one is
entitled to a frivolous appeal, and thus courts regularly find themselves reviewing requests by appointed appellate counsel to withdraw on the grounds that no arguable issues exist. Here the constitutional requirement is that counsel review the record as an
advocate in attempting to identify arguable trial errors before seeking to withdraw; the question is what rule will allow courts to determine whether such review has occurred.47 Attempts to do so directly would prove quite difficult, and the Court has responded by
adopting rules that are crafted to facilitate detection of violations
rather than attempting to track constitutional meaning precisely.
What its decision rule requires of advocates is not the invisible
process of advocacy-oriented review but a tangible work product
that requires a review of the record and an assessment of issues—
not quite what the Constitution demands, but something whose existence a court can easily verify.48
F. Guidance for Other Governmental Actors
One of the hazards of attempting to model decision rules closely
on operative propositions is that general principles do not decide
concrete cases. That is, agreeing that the government may not treat
people differently without an adequate justification is not agreeing
on very much.
The uncertainty created by agreement only on such a high level
of generality is undesirable for a number of reasons. Divergent
46

Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at 67 (emphasis omitted).
As Justice Souter put it, “[a] judicial process that renders constitutional error invisible is, after all, itself an affront to the Constitution.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.
259, 295 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
48
See infra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (discussing Smith v. Robbins).
47
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lower court opinions detract from the uniformity of federal law and
increase the Supreme Court’s workload. Uncertainty on the part of
governmental actors may lead either to excessive timidity or to
wasted resources when a good faith attempt to comply with constitutional demands is later held invalid. For both of these reasons, a
court may substitute a bright-line decision rule for the more standard-like operative proposition.49
IV. DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS
The next question is what the use of the model is: What is the
value of looking at things from this perspective? This Part considers a broad range of existing doctrine from the decision rules perspective. Its breadth comes at some cost in depth. More elaborate
and sustained analyses of particular constitutional provisions and
their associated doctrine would certainly be valuable,50 but the purpose of this Part is to demonstrate the methodology of the decision
rules analysis—the way in which this perspective can illuminate
doctrine.
Briefly put, the methodology is to start with the constitutional
operative proposition and consider its relation to the decision rules
that the Court has crafted.51 Examining this relation suggests which
of the factors set out in Part III are at work in a particular line of
doctrine. Understanding which factors are at work gives us a better
49
At the same time, of course, the Court may be tempted itself to enforce the operative proposition rather than the decision rule it has articulated for lower courts. Professor Frederick Schauer adverted to this possibility. See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 19 (1989). I will suggest that
we have seen it in a variety of contexts. See infra Section V.B.
50
Professor Berman already has provided a more narrowly focused investigation of
the Commerce Clause. See Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the
Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1487 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Piercing the Surface]. I rely in part on his insights in my discussion of that clause.
I believe that the decision rules perspective also reveals both what has gone wrong
with modern substantive due process and how to improve it. Considerations of space
and focus prevent the inclusion of that analysis here, which must be the subject of
another article.
51
The Court does not necessarily work this way. Frequently, modern cases will focus
entirely on doctrine (which generally speaking comprises decision rules) rather than
operative propositions. See Amar, supra note 16, at 74–78. I, however, will suggest the
historical development of doctrine generally follows a similar pattern: Early cases announce the operative proposition and adopt decision rules that track it closely, while
later cases mediate its application through progressively more refined decision rules.
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sense of the source of particular decision rules and thus makes
them easier to evaluate. Frequently, I will claim, it makes doctrine
appear more reasonable than standard accounts, and it offers a
clearer analysis of what motivates particular doctrinal shifts. Additionally, it lets us see how the doctrine might plausibly evolve in
the future, and how it might not.
A. Criminal Procedure
Criminal procedure offers a neat example of the surprising fact
that the decision rules model is both a fully accepted part of modern Supreme Court jurisprudence and, at the same time, subject to
strategic or inadvertent disregard. Two cases from the same Term
demonstrate the divergence.
One of the most hotly anticipated decisions of the Supreme
Court’s 1999 Term was Dickerson v. United States.52 In response to
the Court’s 1968 decision in Miranda v. Arizona,53 Congress enacted Section 3501, which purported to restore the pre-Miranda
“totality of the circumstances” test to determine the voluntariness
and admissibility of confessions in federal court.54 Deemed unconstitutional by most, Section 3501 lay dormant until the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied it, without
the government’s urging, to uphold admission of an unwarned confession.55
Dickerson seemed to present the Court with a difficult decision.
The idea that Miranda was constitutionally required seemed implausible on its face: Could the precise wording of the Miranda
warnings be drawn directly from the Fifth Amendment? (To put
the matter in the terms used earlier, it is hard to see Miranda as either direct enforcement or an attempt at perfect enforcement of
the Self-Incrimination Clause.) If not, however, the conclusion that
followed was not simply that Section 3501 was a permissible replacement but that Miranda itself should be overruled. If Miranda
52

530 U.S. 428 (2000).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
54
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2000).
55
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). As the United States
continued to maintain that § 3501 was unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit allowed
Paul Cassell, a Miranda critic, to share oral argument time for the purpose of defending its constitutionality. Id. at 680 n.14.
53
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was not constitutionally required, how could the Court ever have
imposed it on the states?
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in fact relied on
Miranda’s application to state court proceedings to reach the conclusion that the decision was “constitutionally based.”56 He did not
consider the legitimacy of Miranda ab initio; he was willing to accept its status as precedent without asserting its correctness as an
original matter. Justice Scalia’s dissent attacked that position forcefully, arguing that as Miranda was clearly not compelled by the
Constitution, it could claim constitutional roots only if the Court
had the ability “not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand
it, imposing what it regards as useful ‘prophylactic’ restrictions
upon Congress and the States.”57 “That is an immense and frightening anti-democratic power,” Justice Scalia concluded, “and it does
not exist.”58
The majority did not respond to Justice Scalia’s argument that
the Court had no power to adopt prophylactic rules. Why it remained silent is unclear, but the appropriate response, made most
forcefully by David Strauss, is that such rules are ubiquitous.59 A
prophylactic rule is simply an overenforcing decision rule, and
overenforcement is commonplace. Professor Strauss points to the
content-based/content-neutral distinction in First Amendment
law,60 and I have argued that strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is another example.
Justice Scalia appears to believe that strict scrutiny is in fact part
of the meaning of the Constitution—that is, an operative proposition—because he demands strict scrutiny for affirmative action but
denies the Court’s ability to adopt prophylactic rules. This is a consistent position, though a surprising one for either a textualist or an
originalist.61 Moreover, Miranda might seem different, for it does
not merely adjust the level of deference employed by the Court; it
56

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440.
Id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58
Id.
59
See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190
(1998).
60
Id. at 198–201.
61
The text of the Equal Protection Clause does not identify any particular classifications as suspect, and the Reconstruction Congress seemed to find some racial classifications unproblematic. See infra notes 185–87.
57
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prescribes a particular procedure that governmental actors must
follow. Of course, strict scrutiny itself goes beyond any ordinary
understanding of nondeferential review. By demanding a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring, it sets out rules nearly as
specific as Miranda’s, a good deal more constraining, and equally
difficult to find in the Constitution itself.
A more telling rebuttal to Justice Scalia’s argument, however, is
that earlier in the same Term as Dickerson, the Court decided a
case in which it confronted essentially the same question. In a line
of cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois, the Court had held that,
while the States were not obliged to provide for appellate review of
criminal convictions, the Constitution placed some constraints on
the form such review could take if they did so.62 In particular, if appellate review with assistance of counsel was available to those
who retained paid lawyers, counsel must be provided for indigents.63 Questions then arose about the duties of appointed counsel
who concluded that an appeal was frivolous and sought to withdraw. In Anders v. California, the Court set out a procedure for
such lawyers to follow. In order to assure that indigent appellants
were receiving the substantial equality of treatment that the Constitution guaranteed, appointed lawyers seeking to end their representation should submit “a brief referring to anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal.”64 The requirement that
the brief be submitted was not part of the duty of advocacy (the
operative proposition); it was a device by which a court could determine that the duty of advocacy had been fulfilled—that is, it was
a decision rule.
In People v. Wende, the California Supreme Court endorsed an
alternative procedure, whereby an appointed attorney would simply summarize the factual and procedural history of the case, without identifying any issues she had considered.65 Smith v. Robbins
presented the question of whether the Wende procedure was acceptable, or whether Anders had set out the exclusive means of
62

351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). Griffin’s progeny include Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 355 (1963), Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 741–42 (1967), and Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 79–81 (1988).
63
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357–58.
64
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
65
600 P.2d 1071, 1074–75 (Cal. 1979).
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constitutional compliance.66 Thus, just as Dickerson would, Smith
asked the Court to determine whether the procedure set out in a
previous case was constitutionally required (an operative proposition), or whether it was merely a judicially-crafted device to protect
an underlying constitutional right (a decision rule), for which an
equally effective alternative might be substituted.67
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Smith explicitly described
the Anders procedure as “a prophylactic one” and noted that “the
States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant’s right to appellate
counsel.”68 Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s opinion without
comment, placing him on record as at least implicitly endorsing the
idea that the Court has the power to overenforce constitutional
rights.69
Justice Souter’s dissent took issue with Justice Thomas’s assessment of the Wende procedure, but not with the initial proposition
that the Anders procedure was judicially crafted and nonexclusive.70 Every member of the current Supreme Court, then, is on record supporting the decision rules perspective. From that perspective, Dickerson seems to be much ado about nothing. Obviously,
Miranda created a decision rule. The Fifth Amendment’s SelfIncrimination Clause bars the introduction of compelled confessions; that is the constitutional operative proposition. But a decision rule that simply tracked the operative proposition would have
been undesirable. It would have given little guidance to law en66

528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000).
For a similar analysis of Smith, see Susan R. Klein, Identifying and
(Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1030, 1042–43 (2001).
68
Smith, 528 U.S. at 265.
69
Id. at 263. Interestingly, he seems to have endorsed underenforcement as well, this
time explicitly. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), a case dealing with the unenumerated fundamental right of parents to control the upbringing of their children,
Justice Scalia dissented from the Court’s conclusion that a Washington state law,
which allowed grandparents to obtain visitation rights upon a showing that visitation
was in the best interests of the child, violated the Constitution. Id. at 67, 91. Justice
Scalia argued that unenumerated rights were simply not judicially enforceable, rather
than that they did not exist. “I do not believe that the power which the Constitution
confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view)
infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.” Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70
Smith, 528 U.S. at 292, 297 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67
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forcement officials, who would be left uncertain about how far they
could go in eliciting statements from suspects. Likewise, development on a case-by-case basis would have taken a long time and a
substantial investment of Supreme Court resources to produce a
uniform and consistent body of law. Lastly, the voluntariness determination was difficult for courts to make on the basis of a paper
record that might reveal very little about the actual tone and tenor
of an interrogation.
For all these reasons, a different decision rule was desirable, and
Miranda provided one. The question Dickerson presented was the
extent to which Congress could override the Court’s decision rules.
The answer is that judicially-crafted decision rules should not necessarily be understood as exclusive, and equally effective alternatives for enforcing the operative proposition may be acceptable. In
Smith, the Court had said just that. The problem in Dickerson was
that Congress had offered not an equally effective alternative, but
rather one that simply erased the Court’s rule and thereby reintroduced the problems that had necessitated Miranda in the first
place. That was clearly an insufficient substitute, and rejection was
the appropriate reaction.
What is significant about Dickerson from the perspective of the
broader aims of this Article is the fact that the Court failed to give
the easy answer to Justice Scalia’s attack. While every Justice in
Smith appeared to understand that Supreme Court doctrine may
depart substantially from the operative propositions of the Constitution, this understanding was not brought up when the practice
was challenged. What this suggests is that while the Justices have
internalized the decision rules model to some degree, they do not
necessarily accept it on a conscious level. In other cases, where the
issue has been explicitly debated, one finds only a minority endorsing the decision rules perspective.71
71
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, for instance, a majority of the Justices appeared to endorse Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assertion that judicial pronouncements necessarily track (and establish) the meaning of the Constitution. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). Indeed, the analysis in Garrett goes further. It identifies
the Constitution rather explicitly with what the Court does, down to its allocation of
the burden of proof, rather than with what the Court says. Justice Breyer, writing for
the four dissenting Justices, protested that the Court was mistaking its decision rules
for operative propositions. Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra notes 204–12
and accompanying text.
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B. The Commerce Clause
If the Commerce Clause means what it says—and if we consider
the clause in isolation—the operative proposition might seem fairly
easy to derive from the text: Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, and nothing else. From this perspective, a court
reviewing the exercise of the commerce power might well choose a
decision rule that tracks the operative proposition fairly closely.
The question would be simply whether the activity Congress has
attempted to regulate is commerce, or something else. That question is one of categorization, a type of question that usually falls
within the judicial competence, and we might thus expect that
courts would answer it with little or no deference to legislative
judgment. The decision rule suggested by this analysis was employed in the early twentieth-century cases: Uphold the law if Congress seeks to regulate commerce and strike it down if Congress
seeks to regulate something else, such as manufacture or labor
practices.72
Things are not quite that simple, however, for the Constitution
also gives Congress the power to pass all laws “necessary and
proper for carrying into execution” its enumerated powers. Adding
the Necessary and Proper Clause to the analysis complicates the
construction of the operative proposition. Assuming a fairly
straightforward textualism, the question then becomes: If Congress
has sought to regulate something other than commerce, is the regulation a necessary and proper means to the regulation of commerce?
Answering this question requires us to settle the meaning of
“necessary and proper,” a task that divided the Framers in their
consideration of the First Bank of the United States.73 In
McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall famously announced that “necessary” “frequently imports no more than that
72

See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269, 271–74 (1918) (striking down
regulation of interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor as an impermissible attempt to regulate manufacture).
73
See Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 11–13 (4th ed.
2000) (describing Jefferson’s and Randolph’s responses to the bank controversy); id.
at 13–16 (quoting Hamilton’s argument); James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in James Madison: Writings 480, 484 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 1999) (describing Madison’s position against the Bank).
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one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another.”74
The operative proposition according to McCulloch is that Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce—and also to
pass legislation useful or convenient to such regulation—if the legislative intent is in fact to regulate commerce.75 The relation between this proposition and the substantial effects test on which the
doctrine settled in the late 1930s is not hard to see: If an activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, then its regulation might
well be necessary (in even the strongest sense) to the regulation of
commerce. The substantial effects test, then, seems a relatively
straightforward translation of the operative proposition into doctrine. To this extent, it could be argued that the New Deal Court,
in loosening the strictures on Congress’s commerce power, was
simply rediscovering the Necessary and Proper Clause. In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court consciously echoed the
clause, holding that Congress had the power to regulate intrastate
activities “if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”76
Settling on substantial effects as a doctrinal rule had further consequences. McCulloch had gone on to note that the degree of necessity was a question for the legislature, thereby suggesting that
some deference was appropriate.77 Translating necessity into sub74
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819). See generally Randy Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 183 (2003).
75
McCulloch had suggested that an improper motive might invalidate otherwise
constitutionally sound legislation: “[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing
its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say that such an act was
not the law of the land.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. One might think that this restriction was limited to legislation resting on the Necessary and Proper Clause, via the
principle that pretextual legislation is not “proper.” In Hammer, the Court extended
it even to direct regulation of commerce, disapproving of a ban on interstate shipment
of goods manufactured using child labor on the grounds that “[t]he act in its effect
does not regulate transportation among the States, but aims to standardize the ages at
which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the States.” 247
U.S. at 271–72.
76
301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
77
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423 (stating that for the Court “to inquire into the degree of
its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department,
and to tread on legislative ground”). The factor on which Chief Justice Marshall relied here is institutional competence, based on the nineteenth-century understanding
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stantial effects made the suggestion emphatic. Whether a given activity substantially affects interstate commerce is no longer a categorical question within the judicial competence. It is an empirical
one, and as the Court has recognized, it is the sort that Congress
may be better able to answer. In the absence of any particular reason to suspect that Congress is not answering the question in good
faith, superior legislative competence suggests deference. In
Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court explained that its review demanded only “a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce.”78
For similar institutional reasons, the New Deal Court abandoned
the inquiry into motive. In Sonzinsky v. United States, the Court refused to consider whether a tax on firearm dealers had been enacted for a regulatory purpose, stating that “[i]nquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power
constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of
courts.”79
The decision rules perspective thus gives us the following story
of the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence up to approximately 1995: After some initial attempts to enforce the operative proposition directly, the Court adopted a decision rule (the
substantial effects test) that granted Congress the considerable latitude McCulloch had promised. Because the Court had settled on a
factual issue as dispositive, it was led to defer even further, reasoning that its test fell within the competency of the legislature. This
deference seemed to take the Court out of the business of evaluating Commerce Clause legislation entirely.80 This progression—early
of judging as categorization: Categorical issues are for the courts; questions of degree
are for the legislature. See William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal
Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937, at 4–7 (1998).
78
379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
79
300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937). As the reference to the competency of courts makes
clear, Sonzinsky did not assert that motive was irrelevant, making it consistent with
the pretext passage from McCulloch. Quite swiftly, however, the decision rule that
courts would not inquire into subjective motive came to be understood as an operative proposition that motive was irrelevant. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
115 (1941) (“The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no
restriction and over which the courts are given no control.”).
80
In response, Judge Kozinski suggested that the Commerce Clause could more
properly be called the “Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause.” Alex Kozin-

ROOSEVELT_BOOK

1676

10/27/2005 6:18 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1649

attempts to hew close to the operative proposition, explicit consideration of one or more of the relevant factors, and adoption of a
decision rule notably distinct from the operative proposition—is
the classic course of doctrinal evolution, and we shall encounter it
more than once in the following Sections.
In 1995, however, things changed, as the Court demanded judicially-enforceable limits and began constructing them.81 I postpone
discussion of these cases, for they are not part of the classic progression. Instead, they illustrate what I will argue is the characteristic mistake that occurs when the Court begins to treat its decision
rules as though they were operative propositions.
C. Equal Protection
The story of equal protection jurisprudence is in some ways similar to that of the Commerce Clause. I have suggested that a plausible statement of the constitutional operative proposition underlying the Equal Protection Clause is simply that the government
must have some legitimate justification for treating some people
worse than others.82 The question then is how to translate this operative proposition into decision rules.
The Court’s early decisions characteristically hewed close to the
underlying constitutional proposition: They announced a prohibition on invidious discrimination and applied it on a case-by-case
basis. In Strauder v. West Virginia,83 for instance, the Court described the evils at which the Equal Protection Clause was aimed
as, variously, discrimination motivated by “jealousy and positive
dislike,”84 “unfriendly action,”85 or discrimination “implying inferi-

ski, Introduction, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 5 (1995). The quip reflects a fundamental misunderstanding, a conflation of decision rules and operative propositions.
While the Court’s rational basis jurisprudence did suggest that Congress could do
whatever it wanted as a practical matter (that is, the Court would not restrain it), it
did not suggest this as a constitutional matter. The Court simply gave Congress primary responsibility for observing constitutional limits.
81
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
82
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
83
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
84
Id. at 306.
85
Id.
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ority in civil society.”86 Applying these standards, Strauder found
that exclusion of blacks from jury service was “practically a brand
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority,”87
and therefore unconstitutional. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court
struck down an ordinance that, though facially neutral, was applied
“with an evil eye and an unequal hand,” embodying “hostility to
the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong.”88 But
such a rule offers little guidance to lower courts and governmental
actors, and its administration consumes substantial judicial resources. Thus, over time, the Court developed decision rules that
allowed for a more cost-effective and consistent enforcement of the
operative proposition.
These are the tiers of scrutiny, and the cases introducing them
make clear that they are offered as shortcuts to the detection of invidious discrimination. Skinner v. Oklahoma, the first case to use
the phrase “strict scrutiny” in the equal protection context, explained explicitly that “strict scrutiny of the classification which a
State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or
otherwise, invidious discriminations are made.”89
The question then becomes, when should the anti-deferential
rule of strict scrutiny be employed? It is at this point that the factors enter the picture. Start with the operative proposition that the
government may not treat some people worse than others without
a legitimate reason. Animus is an obviously illegitimate reason, and
86

Id. at 308.
Id.
88
118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). Other early cases specifically invoking invidiousness
include Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30 (1885) (upholding legislation after finding
“no invidious discrimination”) and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (finding a
constitutional violation because “[d]elegates of the State’s power have discharged
their official functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citizens and black”). Even after the Court began to develop the tiers of scrutiny, it continued to refer to invidiousness as the operative proposition. See Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of
whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious
discrimination.”); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966) (finding factual basis for congressional judgment that a state literacy requirement “constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (“Statutes create many classifications which do not
deny equal protection; it is only ‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Constitution.”).
89
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
87
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detection and suppression of animus must therefore be a central
concern of the decision rules.
A legitimate reason might be that the benefits the classification
offers society as a whole exceed the burdens imposed on the disfavored group. Assessment of benefits and burdens ordinarily falls
within legislative competence, so anti-deferential review of classifications not bearing the marks of animus must therefore rely on
some reason to doubt the legislature’s good faith or ability. Inadequately justified classifications might fall into several categories:
first, those that impose excessive burdens on the interests of one
group because the legislature is, though not hostile, indifferent to
their welfare; second, those that impose excessive burdens on a
group because the legislature does not understand their interests or
holds factually false beliefs about them; and third, those that are
cost-justified individually but repeatedly burden the same group
because that group lacks the political power to win benefits
through the legislative process.90
The indicia of suspect classifications that the Court has announced track these concerns quite well. Classifications are suspect, the Court has stated, if they have historically been used for
improper purposes and show little potential for legitimate use.91
They are suspect if they burden groups that are the targets of discrimination or that are denied access to the political process.92 And
they are suspect if they embody attitudes that society, or Congress,
has deemed illegitimate.93
Heightened scrutiny, in short, is a method of allocating judicial
scrutiny to those classifications most likely to be invidious.94 It does
90

See generally Ely, supra note 42, at 152–61.
Certain characteristics “are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (justifying
heightened scrutiny for gender classifications by reference to a “long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination”).
92
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
93
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687–88 (noting Congress’s conclusion “that classifications
based upon sex are inherently invidious”).
94
As Ely put it, “the doctrine of suspect classifications is a roundabout way of uncovering official attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake—to treat a group worse
not in the service of some overriding social goal but largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its members.” Ely, supra note 42, at 153.
91
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not reflect a judgment that these classifications inherently inflict
great harm on those classified. That is, its justification is not that
suspect classifications are high-cost laws.95 In Professor Jed
Rubenfeld’s phrasing, heightened scrutiny in the equal protection
context is more about smoking-out than about balancing.96
As is generally the case, the decision rules that the Court has
chosen will produce results that differ from those the Constitution
prescribes. Rational basis review underprotects the operative
proposition. It is easy to imagine a non-suspect governmental classification that is in fact based on hostility towards its target but that
nonetheless bears some rational relationship to a legitimate interest. Such a law will survive rational basis review, though it is a
quintessential example of invidious discrimination.97
Likewise, strict scrutiny overprotects. It is only somewhat harder
to imagine laws that classify according to race in order to serve legitimate governmental interests. (It is very easy if we include
within the suspect category classifications that benefit members of
a racial minority.) These laws may not be invidious, but they will
be struck down nonetheless. Strict scrutiny for racial classifications
essentially embodies a rule that race may not be used as a proxy,
which reflects the judgment that the aim of racial classifications is
frequently illegitimate, and, if legitimate, can likely be served by
drawing a different line.
This analysis of the factors driving the creation of decision rules
does not, of course, fit perfectly with current doctrine. It suggests a
somewhat different treatment of so-called benign discrimination:
laws that benefit, rather than burden, a minority or politically weak
group.98 It also suggests that heightened scrutiny is probably appropriate for laws that have a disparate impact on politically weak
groups, an approach the Court rejected in Washington v. Davis.99
95

The notable exception here is heightened scrutiny for discrimination with respect
to fundamental rights, which is probably best understood as anti-deferential review of
high-cost classifications. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (applying heightened scrutiny to state law interfering with the right to marry).
96
See Rubenfeld, supra note 39, at 438.
97
Cf. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (noting that
the presence of “negative attitudes” alone does not create a constitutional violation
under the rational basis test).
98
See infra notes 206–10 and accompanying text.
99
426 U.S. 229, 239, 242 (1976).
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Such laws may well be attempts to target disfavored groups by a
legislature aware that overt classifications will be strictly reviewed.
But even if not, a law whose burdens fall disproportionately on a
politically weak group presents a clear example of a situation in
which the legislature’s assessment of benefits and burdens is not to
be trusted. Such laws might well be passed even though their burdens exceed their benefits, and judges seeking to ensure that some
individuals are not treated worse than others without adequate justification should examine them closely.
This account of equal protection is novel in its methodology and
focus. I do not believe that anyone else has made a similar attempt
to trace the evolution of the decision rules as progressively refined
implementations of a constant operative proposition. Its conclusion, however, is quite familiar. That the tiers of scrutiny are not
operative propositions but decision rules is well known.100 In the
1980s, however, the Court’s jurisprudence in this area began to
shift. Those developments are of a piece with the modern Commerce Clause cases and are discussed below in Part VI.
D. Congressional Enforcement Powers
One way of highlighting the distinction between constitutional
operative propositions and decision rules is to consider the question from the perspective of a non-judicial actor. Conscientious legislators, I have suggested, should consider themselves bound by the
operative propositions rather than the decision rules. If the decision rules underenforce the operative propositions, a legislator
should nonetheless attempt to comply with the more stringent operative proposition. (This was one of the main contentions of Professor Larry Sager’s Fair Measure.101) If the decision rule overenforces, the matter is less clear; the legislature may propose
alternatives (as it did in Dickerson and Robbins), but from a practical perspective it is likely to find itself unable to take some ac100
One of the earliest and most penetrating statements of this point was made by
Professor Owen Fiss. Fiss, supra note 19. Professor John Hart Ely’s analysis was much
the same. See Ely, supra note 42, at 145–46 (describing heightened scrutiny as a way
of “‘flushing out’ unconstitutional motivation”). For a more recent example, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 493 (2004)
(“[S]uspect classification was first adopted as an analytic device . . . .”).
101
Sager, supra note 19, at 1264.
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tions that are in fact constitutional. That is the cost of overenforcement.
Generally speaking, then, underenforcing rules give non-judicial
actors greater latitude (which they should in good conscience decline), and overenforcing rules give them lesser (which they must
grudgingly accept). In the case of congressional enforcement powers, however, the relationship may be reversed. Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power “to enforce, by
appropriate legislation,” the other provisions of the Amendment,
notably the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. To be appropriate, enforcement legislation must be reasonably designed to
prevent or remedy violations of the other provisions. That is the
operative proposition.
In crafting decision rules to implement this proposition, the
Court faced two questions. The first was simply what level of deference should be employed, the familiar choice between rational
basis review and various forms of heightened scrutiny. Given no
particular reason to distrust Congress, the Court settled on rational
basis.102 The second, which arises less frequently, was whether congressional legislation should be measured against the operative
propositions underlying the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses or against the decision rules the Court had selected for
those clauses.
In its early cases, the Court fairly clearly chose the former alternative. In reviewing congressional determinations that a given
practice violated the Equal Protection Clause, for instance, the
Court asked explicitly whether Congress might rationally have
found the practice to constitute invidious discrimination—which is,
I have suggested, what the constitutional operative proposition
prohibits.103 Moreover, the Court suggested, Congress was free to
use its own institutional competency in making the determination.
The Court generally eschews a pretext analysis that inquires into
102

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (“It is not for us to review the
congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.”).
103
See id. at 656 (“[I]t is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might
predicate a judgment that the application of New York’s English literacy requirement
to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education in Puerto Rican
schools in which the language of instruction was other than English constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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the subjective intent of legislatures, but it indicated that Congress
might consider such a factor.104 It even went so far as to suggest that
Congress could second-guess a state legislature’s balancing of interests—something the Court does only in highly unusual circumstances—and find an equal protection violation if the balance
struck appeared to slight the interests of some group.105
In short, the post-New Deal Section Five cases adopt the principle that when Congress is determining whether a constitutional
violation exists or is threatened—the predicate for legitimate exercises of the Section Five enforcement power—it is entitled to ask
whether States have complied with the constitutional operative
propositions of Section One, not with the Court’s decision rules.
Those decision rules, as Justice Brennan explained in Oregon v.
Mitchell, are created by consideration of factors including the institutional competence of the judiciary, and Congress is not bound to
observe them.106
From this perspective, the prospect that Congress might prohibit
state practices that would be upheld if challenged in court is unproblematic—not because the prohibition is a means to remedy
some other “real” violation,107 but because Congress might well be
correct in deciding that particular instances of discrimination are
invidious and hence unconstitutional even if the Court’s decision
rules would uphold them. That is, Congress can legislate to enforce
104
See id. at 654 (“Congress might well have questioned . . . whether [the reasons the
state asserted] were actually the interests being served.”).
105
See id. at 653 (“It was well within congressional authority to say that this need of
the Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion upon any state interests served by the English literacy requirement. It was for Congress, as the branch
that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations . . . .”).
106
400 U.S. 112, 246–48 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (“But there is no reason for us to decide whether, in a proper case, we would be
compelled to hold this restriction a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For as
our decisions have long made clear, the question we face today is not one of judicial
power under the Equal Protection Clause. The question is the scope of congressional
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
107
Of course, the Court also recognized that prohibition of some constitutionally
permissible conduct might be an appropriate means to deter or remedy violations. In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, for example, a history of judicially-recognized violations of Fifteenth Amendment rights existed, and the Court allowed a blanket ban on
literacy tests, even though such tests did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment unless
employed in a discriminatory fashion. 383 U.S. 301, 327, 333–34 (1966).
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the full scope of Section One even if the relevant judicial doctrine
underenforces it.
This is not, it should be clear, the same thing as asserting that
Congress should have some power to determine the meaning, or
operative proposition, of Section One.108 It is simply the recognition
that the Court has, for various reasons, decided to underenforce
the operative proposition in certain contexts. Because those reasons relate to institutional factors such as fact-finding competence
and electoral accountability, Congress, which has different institutional capacities, need not follow the underenforcing rules. As Professor Sager puts it, “congressional attempts pursuant to [S]ection
[Five] to enlarge upon the judiciary’s limited construct do no violence to the general notion that the federal judiciary’s readings of
the Constitution are dispositive within our system.”109
Once again, this understanding did not persist. Again, the Court
began to mistake its decision rules for operative propositions.
Those modern cases (roughly, those following City of Boerne v.
110
Flores ) are discussed in Part VI.
E. The Free Exercise Clause
The development of free exercise jurisprudence is well known. I
believe that the decision rules perspective offers additional insights
into the sources and significance of the Court’s different approaches. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court seemed to have settled
on a particular decision rule: Laws that significantly burdened the
108

Indeed, it was the Morgan Court that decided Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958),
the canonical statement of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation. Cooper
admittedly asserts supremacy vis-à-vis the states, but it does suggest that the Court
was not inclined to grant nonjudicial actors an independent power of constitutional
interpretation. Id. at 4.
109
Sager, supra note 19, at 1239; see also Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 11, at
59 (noting that courts should “assess the fit between challenged legislation and the
constitutional operative proposition, not between the statute and the decision rule”).
Conversely, a point Professors Sager and Berman do not make, Congress should not
be allowed to prohibit some practices that courts would strike down when applying an
overenforcing decision rule such as strict scrutiny. Thus, for instance, I would maintain that even if courts continue to strike down some forms of affirmative action (as it
appears they will), Congress could not create a liquidated damages remedy for the
“victims” of such discrimination or impose a criminal sanction on its perpetrators in
the exercise of its enforcement powers.
110
521 U.S. 507 (1997).

ROOSEVELT_BOOK

1684

10/27/2005 6:18 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1649

free exercise of religion would be subject to strict scrutiny and upheld only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.111 Adoption of strict scrutiny, however, does not signal
agreement on the operative proposition. Justices who believed in
different operative propositions might believe that strict scrutiny
was justified for different reasons.
In particular, as explained previously, strict scrutiny may be understood (and has been employed) to serve two quite different
functions. One is smoking out: the detection of illegitimate motives, notably of a desire to target particular groups or activities.112
On this view, the operative proposition forbids governmental attempts to suppress religious activity or belief. The factor supporting strict scrutiny is a distrust of the government, a belief that attempts to suppress religion might be camouflaged by innocent
explanations. Smoking-out strict scrutiny overprotects. Because it
is so intent on catching pretextual legislation, it will strike down
some laws that are in fact perfectly innocent.
The second role of strict scrutiny is balancing: ensuring that the
government has not intruded on highly important interests needlessly or without adequate justification. Strict scrutiny as balancing
does not necessarily overprotect. If the operative proposition is
that religious exercise must be specially regarded, application of
strict scrutiny may track that proposition quite neatly.
Strict scrutiny for laws burdening free exercise could be understood in either of these ways. The history of religious conflict and
persecution might suggest that illicit motives are frequent, and that
overprotection in the name of smoking-out was needed, even if the
operative proposition protects only freedom from the targeting of
religious exercise. Likewise, a belief that religious exercise is a preferred activity would support strict scrutiny as balancing.113
111

374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963).
This, I have argued, is the origin of strict scrutiny in the equal protection context.
See supra Section IV.C.
113
I have suggested that strict scrutiny as balancing is hard to justify without some
reason to suspect legislative motive or competence, since legislatures are typically
considered better than courts at balancing costs and benefits. In the free exercise area,
however, it is easy to imagine that a legislature would be relatively insensitive to the
costs imposed on minority expressions of religious belief, which provides a reason to
abandon the usual deference. For instance, a legislature considering a ban on wine
would likely take into account its sacramental role in the exercise of the Christian re112
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It might have been the case, then, that the Justices supporting
Sherbert’s adoption of strict scrutiny held different beliefs about
the underlying operative proposition. Even if not, however, it was
possible for subsequent Justices to interpret Sherbert in different
ways and advocate or resist changes in the decision rule accordingly.
This is what happened in Employment Division v. Smith.114 There
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, announced that the free exercise right was really a right against targeting. Sherbert’s strict scrutiny had been toothless; when the Court “purported to apply” the
test to contexts other than unemployment benefits, it “always
found the test satisfied.”115 The persistence of results inconsistent
with the normal outcome of strict scrutiny suggested that the Court
had been engaged in smoking-out and was unable to resist the
temptation to uphold laws that it found innocent, even if conventional application of strict scrutiny would have condemned them.
This frequent need to resort to what I will call subterfuge—getting
a particular case “right” according to the operative proposition
while purporting to apply a decision rule directing a contrary result—suggested that the overprotection of smoking-out strict scrutiny was unnecessary. In consequence, Justice Scalia announced,
free exercise claims would henceforth be governed by an antitargeting rule applied with conventional deference to the legislature: “if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object . . . but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended.”116
Other Justices understood Sherbert’s strict scrutiny as balancing
and Smith’s neutrality rule as consequently underprotecting the
fundamental right to free exercise. They thus objected that “[t]he
First Amendment . . . does not distinguish between laws that are
generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices,” but demands a compelling governmental interest to out-

ligion. A legislature considering a ban on peyote might be less attuned to the costs
imposed on the minority that uses peyote in religious ritual.
114
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
115
Id. at 883.
116
Id. at 878.
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weigh religious liberty in either case.117
The value of the decision rules perspective here is that it offers a
clear view of what drives the dispute between the Justices in Smith.
Foregrounding the question of whether Sherbert’s strict scrutiny
was a smoking-out overprotection of an anti-targeting rule, or a
balancing analysis reviewing high-cost governmental action, reveals
conceptual stakes that will be important in other doctrinal areas as
well. In particular, we shall see, this perspective offers a clearer
understanding of congressional enforcement power in the recent
Section Five cases, starting with City of Boerne v. Flores.118
V. THE MINOR PROBLEMS
I have argued thus far that the decision rules perspective helps
resolve doctrinal problems. Distinguishing between operative
propositions and decision rules and paying attention to the factors
that drive the creation of a particular decision rule suggest some
ways in which doctrine might be tailored to better track the underlying operative propositions.
With these virtues come new difficulties. A court aware that it is
creating decision rules will encounter some minor problems. The
Supreme Court has faced these and generally succeeded in surmounting them. A court that forgets it is creating decision rules
will face a larger problem. The Supreme Court has encountered
this one, too, and, especially in recent years, it has handled the
problem poorly. This Part examines what I call the minor problems; the next considers the major problem of calcification.
A. Loss of Fit
Times change, and with them society and social understandings.
Approaches that once appeared feasible and coherent may come to
seem neither; practices that once seemed natural may start striking
people as ideologically freighted, and later obviously invidious. For
all of these reasons, decision rules that made sense when adopted
117
Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 895 (asserting
“that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position,
and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or
indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests”).
118
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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may lose their fit. In such cases, the Court will find it necessary to
change the decision rules. It has done so repeatedly. Here I consider for illustrative purposes two examples drawn from equal protection jurisprudence.
1. Sex Discrimination
The story of sex discrimination jurisprudence is one of decision
rules adapted to fit new societal understandings. At one point, legal distinctions between men and women were seen as a legitimate,
if not inevitable, reflection of the nature of things. Of course, they
were not seen that way by everyone, but the understanding that
men and women were fundamentally different was sufficiently
widespread that it could be counted as sufficient justification for
laws that confined women to the domestic sphere. Some time later,
due in large part to efforts of those who saw things differently, this
understanding came to seem ideologically freighted, and, later still,
illegitimate.119
In Bradwell v. Illinois, four years after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion
of women from the practice of law.120 Justice Bradley, concurring,
observed that “[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life,” and further stated that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.”121 In
1948, the Court observed that a state “could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a bar.”122 The Court acknowledged that the view of women’s appropriate role embodied in such
a law was contested, but it explicitly rejected the idea that changing
understandings about women’s appropriate role could affect constitutional decisions: “The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any
more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific

119
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 410–13 (1995) (discussing contestability and legitimacy).
120
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
121
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
122
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948).
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standards.”123
But attitudes that were merely contestable in 1948 seemed illegitimate by 1973. As a result of the changed understanding, the
Court’s decision rules lost their fit with the underlying operative
proposition—discrimination against women had shifted from natural to invidious. In response, the Court changed its decision rules;
in Frontiero v. Richardson, relying in part on the expressed judgment of Congress, the Court ratcheted up its level of scrutiny.124 As
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel put it, “a social movement
seeking equal citizenship for women prompted sustained constitutional lawmaking by Congress in the early 1970s, which in turn influenced the development of the Court’s own sex discrimination jurisprudence.”125
2. Sexual Orientation
Something similar is occurring with sexual orientation. In two
high-profile cases, the Court struck down laws discriminating
against gays and lesbians.126 But it did not do so by announcing a
higher level of scrutiny for such laws. Instead, purporting to adhere
to the rational basis test, the Court found that neither a state constitutional amendment prohibiting local antidiscrimination ordinances from including sexual orientation as a protected category,
nor a criminal prohibition of same-sex sodomy, was rationally con123

Id. at 466.
411 U.S. 677, 687–88. Frontiero cites Justice Brennan’s opinion in Mitchell and his
opinion for the Court in Morgan, affirming its understanding that Congress might find
invidious things the Court would not necessarily strike down. Id. at 688 (citing Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 240, 248–49 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.) and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1966)).
125
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J.
1943, 1950–51 (2003). Professors Post and Siegel further observe that this “legislative . . . constitutionalism . . . connects constitutional law to the changing constitutional understandings of the American people.” Id. at 1951; see also Jack M. Balkin &
Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 26 (2003) (“Courts once ruled that sexual harassment did not amount to discrimination on the basis of sex . . . [but] [a]fter social
movement protest and litigation, courts came to view harassing conduct of this sort as
sex-based discrimination.”); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 30–40 (2000) (describing equality norms as rooted in evolving social practices).
126
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
124
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nected to a legitimate state interest.
Again, what has happened here is that the old decision rule—
rationality review of laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation—has lost fit. The Court has come to believe that such laws
are not a legitimate expression of moral disapproval but rather invidious discrimination. It is too soon to tell whether application of
heightened scrutiny to this new class is at the end of this path. The
current Court seems hesitant to announce new “suspect classes”—
perhaps because it believes that doing so amounts to changing the
Constitution, and hence is of questionable legitimacy at best. Failing to change the decision rule, however, leaves the Court in an
uncomfortable position. If it adheres to the view that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is frequently invidious, it will
likely continue to strike down such discrimination while nominally
applying the rational basis test, producing opinions that are confusing to lower courts and commentators alike.127 I refer to this practice as subterfuge; I now turn to the challenge it presents for courts.
B. Subterfuge
One of the notable characteristics of decision rules, as I have described them, is that they get cases wrong. They direct courts to
strike down laws that are constitutionally sound and to uphold laws
that are unconstitutional. They may do so in the hopes of minimizing aggregate errors over time, or they may do so for other reasons,
but they will at times produce results that strike judges as palpably
incorrect.128 A lower court judge in such cases has few options; she
is bound to apply the doctrine the Supreme Court has given her.
The Supreme Court, however, has no one to reverse it for misapplying doctrine, and few, if any, effectual critics. The Court there127
In Lawrence, Justice O’Connor suggested that “[w]hen a law exhibits . . . a desire
to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.” 539
U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). This is perhaps an apt description of some of
the subterfuge cases, but it is not recognizable doctrine. It mingles the operative
proposition (a prohibition on invidious discrimination) with the decision rule (rational
basis) in a way that provides very little guidance for lower courts. It does, however,
reveal the extent to which Justice O’Connor’s analysis is driven by a desire to enforce
the operative proposition rather than the decision rule.
128
Suzanne Goldberg points out some of these problems and suggests abandoning
the tiers of scrutiny entirely. Suzanne B. Goldberg, supra note 100.
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fore may succumb to the temptation to get a particular case right
according to the relevant operative proposition, rather than faithfully applying the decision rule it has announced.129
Sometimes the practice is simply a harbinger of changes to the
decision rules. As discussed in Section IV.E, strict scrutiny (announced in Sherbert v. Verner) of laws burdening the free exercise
of religion was surprisingly mild. This foreshadowed the milder
new decision rule announced in Employment Division v. Smith—a
move from an overprotective rule to a rule more closely tracking
the operative proposition, or from a balancing rule to an underprotective rule, depending on whom you ask. Likewise, the unusually
forceful rational basis review of Reed v. Reed130 prophesied the
heightened scrutiny adopted in Frontiero.
Sometimes, however, the decision rule does not change. In City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, for instance, the Court
struck down a law discriminating on the basis of mental disability,
while at the same time reiterating that mental disability categorizations warranted no more than rational basis review.131 In its sexual
orientation cases, the Court has continued to adhere to the rational
basis test,132 and in its recent holding that the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, it claimed to be applying strict scrutiny.133
And in Pierce County v. Guillen,134 discussed in Section VI.A.1 below, the Court announced continued adherence to the Commerce
129

The unusual frequency with which statements of the operative proposition occur
in the cases I identify as subterfuge suggests that the Court at least is partially aware
that it is enforcing the operative proposition, and not the appropriate decision rule.
See supra note 127 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s Lawrence concurrence ).
130
404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (holding that statute giving preference to males over
females in estate administration violates Equal Protection Clause).
131
473 U.S. 432, 442–44, 450 (1985).
132
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632
(1996).
133
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). I believe the result in Grutter was
certainly right, but the dissenters make a persuasive case that the Court’s “strict scrutiny” is of the watered-down variety. See id. at 379–80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
see also Balkin & Siegel, supra note 125, at 25 (“[I]nconsistency in the decision rules
used to implement the anticlassification principle arises as courts endeavor to apply
the anticlassification principle in a manner that constrains practices that seem to
judges to inflict racial injustice, while enabling practices that seem to judges innocent
of discriminatory animus and that serve other important social ends.”).
134
537 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2003).
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Clause analysis set out in United States v. Morrison and United
States v. Lopez, though as Professor Mitchell Berman has shown,
those tests would more plausibly produce the opposite result.135
Subterfuge has some undesirable consequences. It is confusing
to lower court judges, who must puzzle out how to follow a Court
whose words diverge from its practice.136 It is a bounty to academics, who seize the opportunity to explain, but their efforts may not
prove particularly helpful—indeed, noting the inconsistency between words and deeds may be the best a commentator can do.137
Since a court engaged in subterfuge refuses to explain why it
reaches a result at variance with its stated approach, others must
speculate, and speculation does not justify a lower court’s attempt
to follow the Supreme Court’s unstated rationale.
Indeed, the desire not to authorize lower courts to apply the rule
the Court refuses to announce is probably one of the more significant causes of subterfuge. It is not an adequate justification, however, and it makes the Court appear arrogant, unprincipled, or
both. It suggests a lack of faith in either the lower courts or the unannounced rule, or perhaps a belief that society will not accept it.
Popular acceptance, however, has at least something to do with
constitutional legitimacy, and the need for doctrine to be susceptible to application by lower courts is a useful check on the Court’s
ability to engage in what Professors Balkin and Levinson call “low
politics”—reaching a particular result because that result, rather
than the rule that produces it, is seen as desirable.138 It may be that
some cases are significant enough that getting the right answer is
135

See Berman, Piercing the Surface, supra note 50, at 1501–04.
See, e.g., Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting debate
over significance of Cleburne and difficulties for lower courts).
137
See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 65 (1992) (suggesting that the Court uses two different
forms of rational basis review in an unpredictable fashion); R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme
Court Practice, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 225, 236 (2002) (identifying seven forms of rational basis review); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 779, 801–03 (1987) (noting the confusion that heightened rational basis review causes lower courts and legislatures).
138
See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1061–63 (2002) (distinguishing between high and low politics).
136
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more important than following existing doctrine, but a Court that
engages in subterfuge rather than explaining itself denies the rest
of us the opportunity to evaluate that judgment.139
Perhaps the best that can be said for subterfuge is that it offers
an implicit reminder that decision rules and operative propositions
diverge. By deciding a particular case in accordance with the operative proposition, and not the decision rule, the Court offers an
object lesson to lower courts and society—particular practices, it
suggests, should not be deemed constitutionally unproblematic
merely because they would survive a conventional doctrinal analysis. But the Court could achieve this goal more cleanly by explicitly
announcing the distinction—by stating, for example, that it is upholding a practice the Justices believe is unconstitutional because it
has chosen to leave primary responsibility for enforcing a particular operative proposition with nonjudicial actors. Additionally, it
could distinguish operative propositions and decision rules consistently in its cases. As the next Part discusses, however, its recent
tendency has been instead to deny the distinction entirely.
VI. THE MAJOR PROBLEM: CALCIFICATION
I have argued that a standard pattern replays itself in development of constitutional doctrine. In its early encounters with a particular constitutional provision, the Court tends to stay quite close
to the constitutional operative proposition. As time passes, doctrine becomes more complex. Judicial experience with the sort of
problems presented by adjudication under a particular provision
leads to the development of decision rules that depart from the operative proposition. When initially articulating such decision rules,
the Court frequently explains what it is doing, and why—that, for
instance, it is deferring to congressional determinations about effects on commerce because of legislative competence, or that it is
ratcheting up the level of scrutiny for gender-based discrimination
because of pervasive prejudice and stereotyping. Decision rules

139
Cleburne plainly is not such a case. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), from one
perspective, might have been, and there the Court was a little more candid—it articulated a new equal protection doctrine to be applied in that case alone. See id. at 109
(“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
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may lose fit over time if facts or background understandings
change. When this happens, the Court may—indeed, should—
change the decision rule to fit the new circumstances. In doing so,
the Court is simply employing a new method to implement an unchanging operative proposition.
But this account of the normal life cycle of decision rules does
not offer a complete picture. Sometimes, when a stable jurisprudential regime has persisted for a period of time, decision rules can
start to be mistaken for constitutional operative propositions.140
When this happens, a number of undesirable consequences follow.
These consequences include ill-advised doctrinal reform, attempts
to bind nonjudicial actors to decision rules rather than operative
propositions, and an undoing of the benefits of decision rules. I
consider these problems in turn.
A. Doctrinal Deformation
Confusing decision rules and operative propositions warps doctrine in two related ways. A court may discard decision rules not
because they have lost fit but because they do not make sense as
operative propositions. Alternatively, it may accept them as operative propositions and make other doctrinal changes, in the same or
related fields, in order to maintain consistency.
1. The Commerce Clause
Congressional power under the pre-Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence was famously unbounded.141 This is not to say that the
Constitution imposed no limits; it did. According to the operative
propositions I have drawn from McCulloch v. Maryland, Congress
could pass only legislation that was a useful or convenient means of
regulating commerce, and it could do so only in order to regulate

140

Professor Sager noted the similar tendency “to equate the existence of a constitutional norm with the possibility of its enforcement against an offending official.”
Sager, supra note 19, at 1221. Professor Sager was concerned that other decisionmakers not believe that the lack of enforcement indicated an absence of constitutional
rules. This Article focuses on the problems that arise when courts equate the possibility of enforcement with the demands of the Constitution, and it deals with both underenforcing and overenforcing rules.
141
See Kozinski, supra note 80, at 5.

ROOSEVELT_BOOK

1694

10/27/2005 6:18 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1649

commerce.142 The limits set by these operative propositions, however, depend in one case on a factual issue and in the other on
something like the subjective motive of the enacting Congress.
Given that the post-New Deal Court neither claimed superior
competence with respect to legislative facts nor ventured to assess
subjective motivation, the decision rules it adopted regarding these
limits were deferential to the point of committing the determination almost entirely to Congress.
United States v. Lopez143 and United States v. Morrison144 announced that this almost-complete deference was unacceptable,
and set about imposing judicially enforceable limits. This subsection describes what happened in those cases from the decision rules
perspective. A plausible first take might be that the Court in Lopez
and Morrison recognized that the extant decision rules had lost fit.
It was a commonplace observation that Congress seldom deployed
its institutional expertise by actually making the factual determination upon which its power was supposed to rest.145 The Gun-Free
School Zones Act, struck down in Lopez, was not accompanied by
any findings explaining the relation of guns near schools to interstate commerce.146 Equally alarming, even when regulated activities
clearly did substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress was
frequently regulating them for other reasons—something that, if
we take McCulloch’s pretext passage seriously, might be unconstitutional.147

142

See supra Section IV.B.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
144
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
145
See Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57, 98 (1986) (noting that “Congress has
neither a strong tradition of constitutional decisionmaking nor trustworthy procedures for addressing constitutional questions”); cf. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the
Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez,
46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 695, 711 (noting Congress’s willingness to engage in “sustained and increasingly thoughtful” fact finding to justify Commerce Clause legislation during the New Deal era).
146
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (noting lack of findings).
147
In a 1963 letter to the Department of Justice, Professor Gerald Gunther objected
to the use of the Commerce Clause to justify civil rights legislation, commenting that
“[t]he proposed end run by way of the commerce clause seems to me ill-advised in
every respect. . . . It would, I think, pervert the meaning and purpose of the commerce
clause to invoke it as the basis for this legislation.” Gerald Gunther, Cases and Mate143
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Congress’s refusal to exercise the competence to which the
Court was supposed to defer, coupled with repeated pretextual
uses of the commerce power, might well have suggested to the
Court that it was confronting a pattern of constitutional violations.
Just as it had adopted heightened equal protection scrutiny in response to the pervasiveness of invidious gender-based discrimination, the Court might have felt justified in adopting a less deferential decision rule for reviewing Commerce Clause legislation.
Frequency of constitutional violations is not the only factor that
could be invoked to support a less deferential decision rule. The
Court also might have believed that Congress could no longer be
trusted to restrain itself within constitutional bounds. A plausible
story can be told along the lines of the sort of process analysis that
Carolene Products Co. v. United States148 employs. One of the purposes of overlapping state and federal sovereignties is to make the
two governments compete for the affection of the people.149 They
do so, in part, by providing legislation to solve particular problems.
The people probably care little, if at all, which government is solving their problems, and they are consequently willing to accept
federal solutions to problems that state and local governments are
competent to handle. When U.S. senators were selected by state
legislatures, a counterweight existed against excessive federal activity. State legislatures want to solve the problems that they can, and
federal solutions prevent them from getting credit from their constituents. Thus, state legislatures were likely to select senators who
would respect the appropriate sphere of state legislative power and
reserve federal power for uniquely federal problems. With the
Seventeenth Amendment providing for direct election of senators,
this check on the exercise of federal power was eliminated. Excessive federal regulation was the natural consequence,150 and concern
that the Seventeenth Amendment had eliminated a structural prorials on Constitutional Law 203 (10th ed. 1980), quoted in Paul Brest et al., Processes
of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 471 (4th ed. 2000).
148
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
149
See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1428
(1987).
150
Such concerns were voiced at the time of ratification. See Ralph A. Rossum, The
Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 671, 712–14 (1999) (noting federalismbased arguments against direct election).
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tection of federalism might offer a reason to be less willing to trust
the good faith of Congress.151
The problem with casting Lopez and Morrison as the reaction to
a loss of fit is twofold. First, the rules the Court adopted make very
little sense from that perspective. A pattern of congressional failure to make the determination that a regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce supports a decision rule requiring explicit findings or some showing that Congress had considered
the issue. Concern about pretextual legislation might have suggested similar demands—either evidence of congressional attention to effects on interstate commerce, or even a heightened
means-end fit requirement.152 Even an inarticulate yearning for
federalism of the sort that seems to be driving the Court’s sovereign immunity cases (which, after Alden v. Maine153 can no longer
be called Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence) would have suggested something like the short-lived National League of Cities v.
Usery154 protection of integral state functions.
But the Court gave us none of the rules that would be justified
by a loss of fit. Process-based federalism was suggested by a num-

151

Justice Souter’s dissent in Morrison considered the relevance of the Seventeenth
Amendment, making the point that it was not a “rip[] in the fabric of the Framers’
Constitution, inviting judicial repairs.” 529 U.S. 598, 652 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). This certainly is true in terms of operative propositions: if an amendment
changes the Constitution, the Court is not justified in fighting its natural and intended
consequences. Use of the federal commerce power that seems excessive in terms of
the “appropriate” balance between state and federal regulation is one such consequence, and the Court has no business trying to check it. But increased unconstitutional use—notably, pretextual legislation—also is predictable, and the Seventeenth
Amendment did not change the scope of the commerce power. To the extent that the
Seventeenth Amendment undermined the reasons to believe that Congress could be
trusted not to engage in pretextual legislation, it might justify a less deferential decision rule. Neither Lopez nor Morrison, however, relied on this point.
152
Changing the decision rules to focus on pretext would probably have seemed unappealing for two reasons. First, inquiries into legislative purpose are difficult, intrusive, and invite legislative dissembling in response. Second, adoption of such a rule
would likely have suggested that broad swaths of civil rights legislation were unconstitutional, an almost unimaginable step for the Court to take.
153
527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives
from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
154
426 U.S. 833, 849 (1976) (striking down Fair Labor Standards Act amendments as
applied to state employers as interference with “traditional aspects of state sovereignty”), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
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ber of academics in the wake of Lopez,155 but it was rejected by
Morrison, which disregarded a “mountain” of findings.156 The limits
the Court announced in Morrison, which give an incompletely defined significance to noncommercial activity, attenuated causal
chains, and areas of traditional state concern, do not make sense as
decision rules designed to better enforce the substantial effects operative proposition. Nor do they make much sense as operative
propositions in their own right: The lines they draw track neither
core exercises of the commerce power, such as protection of interstate commerce, nor areas of significance to states.157 In fact, they
are dredged from the cases as more or less the only things that the
pre-Lopez Court had not gotten around to explicitly endorsing—
though Wickard v. Filburn came perilously close.
This brings us to the second problem with viewing Lopez and
Morrison as reactions to a loss of fit. The Court did not present its
new federalism rules as responses to changed circumstances or
even a sensible means of protecting some substantive value of federalism. It presented them as deductions from a structural argument: The federal government is one of enumerated powers, therefore some limits must exist, and these are the limits that precedent
allows.158
Structural argument is powerful, and the one deployed in Lopez
and Morrison is unassailable, at least as far as its first two steps go.
But it does not resolve the question presented by Lopez and Morrison, because it is an argument about operative propositions. It
says nothing about what decision rules should be adopted to implement those operative propositions. To say that limits to the
commerce power exist is not to say how courts should enforce
155
See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 145, at 697 (concluding that “the approach taken in
Lopez may be a plausible technique to encourage appropriate congressional procedures and consideration”); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v.
Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 207 (1995).
156
529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
157
Id. at 659 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “any substantive limitation will apply randomly in terms of the interests the majority seeks to protect”).
158
See Post & Siegel, supra note 125, at 2054 (arguing that “there is an indistinct but
urgent apprehension that the Court must draw ‘real limits’ that have ‘substance’”);
Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1295, 1323 (1997)
(“The actual limiting principle, then, on which Chief Justice Rehnquist can be said to
rely in Lopez, is the weirdly circular proposition that there must be a limiting principle.”).
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them, or even that courts should enforce them at all. The Court in
Lopez and Morrison assumed that its decision rules were operative
propositions and rejected them because they seemed implausible
as such.
That conclusion is a non-sequitur, as the dissenters observed.159
Reasons for less deferential review of the congressional determination that a law was within the scope of the commerce power may
well have existed—I have suggested some—but the Lopez and
Morrison majorities did not offer them and did not articulate decision rules responsive to those reasons. Instead, the Court assumed
that the existence of limits implied judicially enforceable limits.160
Existing doctrine did not provide these—the substantial effects
test, as Justice Breyer pointed out, suggested deference, “because
the determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a
legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy.”161
Thus, the Court transformed its decision rules to make the key
questions ones more plausibly within the sphere of judicial competence.162 That, ultimately, seems the best explanation for the rules
that Morrison and Lopez announced. Whether the regulated activity is commercial, the causal chain attenuated, or the area one of
traditional state concern are not the relevant questions on any reasonable understanding of either federalism or the operative propo-

159

Justice Souter’s dissent in Morrison and Justice Breyer’s in Lopez both make the
point that the question of substantial effect is one for Congress in the first instance.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The fact of such a substantial
effect is not an issue for the courts in the first instance, but for the Congress . . . .” (citation omitted)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution
requires us to judge the connection between a regulated activity and interstate commerce, not directly, but at one remove.”).
160
See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review 226 (2004) (describing the Rehnquist Court as adopting “a jurisprudence that treats constitutional limits as synonymous with judicial enforcement and
that, as a result, calls for the Court to adopt an aggressive stance vis-à-vis the political
branches”).
161
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162
The nature of the substantial effects question was debated in Lopez and Morrison. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s transformation of substantial effects question into one “dependent upon a uniquely judicial
competence”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (asserting that whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce “is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative
question, and can be settled finally only by this Court” (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964)).
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sition underlying the Commerce Clause. But they are ones that the
Court can claim for itself.
The failure to distinguish between decision rules and operative
propositions has thus led the Court to reject its Commerce Clause
decision rules for patently inadequate reasons. Worse, it has led
the Court to replace them not with new decision rules crafted to
better enforce the operative proposition in light of changed circumstances—something I have suggested would be at least partially defensible—but rather with a congeries of ad hoc quasicategorical lines designed to preserve judicial supremacy. The
Court suggests that these are operative propositions—that Congress’s Commerce Clause power truly does not extend to noncommercial activities within the historical scope of state regulation
affecting interstate commerce only via an attenuated causal
chain—but it does not seem to believe its own protestations. When
confronted with a regulation of such activity that really was an attempt to protect interstate commerce, the Court upheld it with
very little discussion.
That case was Pierce County v. Guillen, in which the Court upheld a federal law protecting from discovery information collected
by states in connection with federal highway safety programs.163 As
Professor Mitchell Berman describes at greater length, this statute
“regulated apparently non-commercial activity . . . and interfered
with a traditional area of state sovereignty.”164 Professor Berman
suggests, and I agree, that the Guillen Court upheld the statute because the Lopez majority does in fact believe that the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, as a matter of operative propositions, grant Congress the power to regulate intrastate noncommercial activity traditionally within state sovereignty so long as it is
doing so for interstate commercial ends.165 That is, the Court seems
to understand the operative proposition as something like substantial effects with a pretext carve-out—exactly what McCulloch suggested. The discomfort that gave rise to Lopez and Morrison was
with the decision rules that earlier Courts had crafted to implement
that operative proposition.
163

537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003).
Berman, Piercing the Surface, supra note 50, at 1489.
165
Id. at 1518; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215–18 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (discussing import of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
164
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Understanding that these were decision rules might have allowed the Court to modify them in ways that would produce a better fit in the changed circumstances of a national economy and a
popularly elected Senate. Because it treated the decision rules as
operative propositions, however, the Court created a new doctrinal
test that makes no sense as either a decision rule or an operative
proposition. The willingness to engage in subterfuge in Guillen
demonstrates the Court’s own awareness of the inadequacy.
2. Equal Protection
Up until at least the late 1970s, equal protection jurisprudence
followed the lines set out in footnote four of Carolene Products,
and it did so self-consciously in terms of decision rules. That is, the
Court repeatedly asserted that the operative proposition behind
the Equal Protection Clause was essentially a prohibition on invidious discrimination or a requirement that the government have
a legitimate reason for differential treatment.166 It implemented this
rule through a regime that deferred to the legislative judgment in
the ordinary case, but adopted less deferential review or antideferential review of laws that burdened the interests of groups
that were politically weak or that had been the targets of invidious
discrimination in the past, especially if the attitudes producing such
discrimination still persisted.
Focus on these factors makes perfect sense. As the Carolene
Products Court saw, and Professor John Hart Ely emphasized, a
legislature’s cost-benefit calculus is less trustworthy if the burdens
of a law fall on a group with little political voice, or if the legislature is likely to hold mistaken views about the attributes or preferences of members of the burdened group.167 Things changed as the
battle over affirmative action gained greater political prominence.168 First in a case involving a city council, and then with the
166

See supra Section IV.C.
See Ely, supra note 42, at 103. Thus, in Ely’s analysis, prejudice is relevant in two
ways. First, it may prevent a group from forming coalitions and winning benefits
through the normal process of interest group politics. Second, it may lead legislators
to err in their cost-benefit analysis, even if they perform the analysis with proper concern for members of the burdened group. Id. at 157, 161.
168
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court fractured badly over
an affirmative action program. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell, joined by Justice
167
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federal government, the Court announced that legislation discriminating in favor of racial minorities would also receive strict scrutiny.169
For anyone with a sense of how the tiers of scrutiny had developed, this was a surprising result. Justice O’Connor’s majority
opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Pena explains it by invoking
three themes: skepticism of racial classifications, consistency in application of equal protection, and congruence between the rules
applied to the federal government and those applied to the states.170
Taken together, she reasoned, the three principles established that
“any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under
the strictest judicial scrutiny.”171
The second of these principles has done most of the work in
bringing the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence to where it is
today. Justice O’Connor traces the demand for consistency back to
Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.172 In fact, it can be found substantially earlier. In the Civil
Rights Cases, Justice Bradley announced that at some point, blacks
must cease to be “the special favorite of the laws,” and their rights
“protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are
protected.”173 As Professor Richard Primus has observed, Justice
Bradley’s criticism of antidiscrimination measures was misplaced;
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which Justice Bradley’s opinion struck
White, rejected the petitioners’ argument that heightened scrutiny should apply only
to laws burdening “discrete and insular minorities,” on the grounds that “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded
the same protection, then it is not equal.” Id. at 289–90 (quoting United States v.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). Justice Powell’s reasoning, I will argue,
is what has driven the progress to strict scrutiny for affirmative action, and it illustrates the fundamental problem of mistaking decision rules for operative propositions.
169
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
170
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223–24.
171
Id. at 224.
172
See id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90). The concern about consistency also is
featured in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, where it was mentioned as one
of the reasons not to count the mentally handicapped as a suspect class. 473 U.S. 432,
443–45 (1985).
173
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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down, granted no special privileges to blacks but simply forbade all
racial discrimination.174 “Today,” Professor Primus continues, “such
criticism of facially neutral antidiscrimination laws seems tendentious and farfetched. . . . The issue today is the legitimacy of overt
racial preferences . . . .”175
Interestingly, however, the argument for heightened scrutiny of
racial preferences turns out to be quite similar to Justice Bradley’s—that is, it attacks as special favoritism a regime that is in fact
neutral. The argument is simple: if racial classifications burdening
minorities are subject to strict scrutiny, so too must be all racial
classifications. As Justice Powell put it in Bakke, in language echoing Justice Bradley’s, racial minorities cannot be “special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others”:
they cannot be the special favorites of the Constitution.176
As an argument about the substantive meaning of the Constitution, this makes good sense. An Equal Protection Clause that permitted discrimination against a particular group only for compelling reasons but allowed discrimination in their favor with a lesser
justification would hardly deserve the name. But it is not an argument that makes much sense with respect to decision rules. Decision rules are adapted to particular cases and contexts; they are ad
hoc responses to a changing landscape. They frequently will lack
some of the attributes (such as symmetry) that we demand of constitutional operative propositions. Indeed, if understood as constitutional operative propositions, they will frequently seem obviously wrong.
An asymmetrical Equal Protection Clause is an absurdity: Equal
protection is a shield against invidious discrimination, and of
course it must shield all people equally. The tiers of scrutiny, however, are decision rules adopted in the equal protection context
based not on how costly particular forms of discrimination were
deemed to be, but rather on how likely they were to be invidious.
The factors that make discrimination against a particular group
174

Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 493, 526 (2003).
175
Id.
176
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Alexander M. Bickel,
The Morality of Consent 133 (1975) (arguing that affirmative action means that
“[t]hose for whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal than others”).
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likely to be invidious—lack of political power, past and current
prejudice, a history of discriminatory treatment—obviously do not
convey similar information about discrimination in favor of that
group. If anything, they suggest the contrary—such discrimination
is especially likely not to be invidious.177
The argument that consistency demands strict scrutiny for affirmative action, then, is mistaken in much the same way as Justice
Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. The operative proposition of equal protection is indeed symmetrical, protecting no person more than any other. But decision rules will have special favorites, as long as, and to the extent that, state actors have special
victims.
The consistency argument in favor of strict scrutiny for affirmative action is driven by the confusion of decision rules and operative propositions. The decision rules perspective allows us to see
that a demand for consistency in operative propositions does not
support a similar demand with respect to decision rules. It also, I
believe, gives us a useful vantage point from which to assess the
Court’s current approach to equal protection. Decision rules make
sense, I have argued, to the extent that they can be derived from
operative propositions by means of the application of certain factors that suggest greater or lesser deference to legislative judgments. What sort of factors support strict scrutiny of affirmative action?
Distrust of the legislature’s ability to give equal weight to the interests of those it is burdening—the basic Carolene Products concern—cuts no ice here. Nor is there any history of invidious discrimination by majorities against themselves. Indeed, the
constitutional argument against affirmative action is not that it is
invidious in the sense of being inspired by animus.178 Instead, Ada177

See Ely, supra note 42, at 170 (“There is no danger that the coalition that makes
up the white majority in our society is going to deny to whites generally their right to
equal concern and respect.”).
178
Justice O’Connor does come close to suggesting that affirmative action may be
motivated by hostility towards its purported beneficiaries. See, e.g., City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“Absent searching judicial inquiry into
the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining
what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”). However,
the alternative to benign here appears to be not “invidious” but rather “not cost-
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rand’s analysis suggests a different factor at work. “[A]ny individual,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “suffers an injury when he or she is
disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race . . . .”179
The gravity of the injury is determined not by the magnitude of the
disadvantage, but by the use of the racial classification.180 Strict
scrutiny is applied not to detect animus but to assess whether the
government’s interest is weighty enough to justify the infliction of
this injury. This explanation can in fact be cast in terms of the factors I have discussed as driving the creation of particular decision
rules. It boils down to the proposition that racial classifications are
high-cost laws.
The high cost of a law can support non-deferential review, but as
the sole factor, it tends to be inadequate. This is because the balancing of burdens and benefits, even large ones, is usually left to
legislatures for reasons of both institutional competence and electoral accountability.181 There is no reason to suppose that the Court
will be any better at deciding whether a particular high-cost law is
cost-justified, and in a democracy, such balancing plausibly belongs
primarily with the legislature.182 Indeed, it is just those arguments

justified.” See id. (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”). Thus, as Professor
Jed Rubenfeld observes, the purpose of strict scrutiny has shifted from smoking-out
to balancing. Rubenfeld, supra note 39, at 465.
179
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995).
180
Thus the fact that affirmative action programs impose only a statistically minimal
disadvantage on white applicants, see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke
and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1045, 1078–80
(2002), is not relevant to the Court’s calculus. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650–51
(1993) (suggesting that racial classification in redistricting by itself is an injury, regardless of effects on voting power).
181
Justice Stevens made a similar point in his Adarand dissent:
I am not persuaded that the psychological damage brought on by affirmative action is as severe as that engendered by racial subordination. That, in any event,
is a judgment the political branches can be trusted to make. . . . If the legislature
is persuaded that its program is doing more harm than good to the individuals it
is designed to benefit, then we can expect the legislature to remedy the problem. Significantly, this is not true of a government action based on invidious
discrimination.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 248 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182
The chief value of judicial review in such cases, I have suggested, is that the judiciary may serve as a second negative, and one less susceptible to the temporary excesses of popular sentiment that can infect legislatures. See supra Section III.A. But
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that make modern fundamental rights substantive due process jurisprudence look illegitimate.183
One of the ironies of the affirmative action cases, then, is that
those Justices who most strongly deplore unwarranted judicial intrusion into democratic decisionmaking in the due process arena
support a similar intervention in the name of equal protection, in
spite of the similarities between the two areas. Like the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause offers a general and highly
abstract principle. It makes no more mention of race than the Due
Process Clause does of abortion or child-rearing. What is required
to get specific decision rules out of these general propositions is a
theory about when legislatures cannot be trusted.
Here the foes of affirmative action stand perhaps on weaker
ground than the proponents of fundamental rights due process.
The heavy burden imposed by laws prohibiting abortion or samesex sodomy is fairly clear.184 The high cost of a racial classification is
somewhat less obvious, and the Court has never offered any empirical evidence for its existence. Instead, the Justices tend to write
as though the Equal Protection Clause simply contained a categorical ban on racial classifications.185 The Reconstruction Congress
did give us some such concrete negations, notably the Thirteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.186 But the Fourteenth Amendment
does not ban any particular practice with similar specificity. If the
members of the Reconstruction Congress thought they were flatly
prohibiting anything, it was probably invidious discrimination
against blacks. They did not think they were categorically prohibiting race-based remedial measures; they enacted some themselves.187
affirmative action programs are not generally adopted in response to popular hysteria.
183
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia,
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 923 (1973).
184
See Ely, supra note 183, at 923.
185
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“What the Equal Protection Clause does prohibit are
classifications made on the basis of race.”).
186
The Thirteenth Amendment bans slavery, U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1, and the
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits disenfranchisement on racial grounds. U.S. Const.
amend. XV, § 1. The term “concrete negation” I owe to Professor Richard Primus.
Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights 7 (1999).
187
See Rubenfeld, supra note 39, at 430–31.
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The assertion that racial classifications are generally prohibited,
then, is not plausible as an account of the operative proposition
behind the Equal Protection Clause. It is supported neither by text
nor history. It must be defended as a decision rule, and here the
only justification put forward is that racial classifications are high
cost.188 This can be a partial justification, but its application to affirmative action shows its deficiencies in a particularly glaring light.
The decision rules perspective, I have noted, allows one to describe the march of equal protection as the story of a progressive
Court ratifying the achievements of social movements. Groups
make their claims for equal treatment, and at a certain point the
Court steps in and announces that the struggle is over: Discrimination against that group has been established as invidious, and it will
no longer be allowed.189 If equal protection jurisprudence focuses
on classifications rather than classes, however, the story is somewhat different. Historically downtrodden groups make their claims,
and after they have achieved a certain degree of success, the Court
steps in and announces that they cannot be treated differently at
all. Discrimination against them is no longer allowed, but the interest group politics that long disfavored them cannot be used to their
advantage. The government may grant subsidies to farmers, married couples, or the unemployed; universities can adopt preferential admission policies for athletes, flautists, alumni children, or applicants from remote geographical regions.190 Racial minorities,
almost alone, cannot be favored, and if we ask why, the reason is

188

The Court also has observed that racial classifications are “‘in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited.’” Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). This is at
best an extremely odd thing to say. Legions of irrelevant classifications receive rational basis review, and as Justice Ginsburg has observed, “[o]ur jurisprudence ranks
race a ‘suspect’ category’” not because it is irrelevant but “‘because it is one which
usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial
inequality.’” Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931–32 (2d Cir.
1968)).
189
See supra Section IV.C.
190
Surprisingly, Justice Thomas made much of this point in arguing against the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Equal Protection Clause
does not, however, prohibit the use of unseemly legacy preferences or many other
kinds of arbitrary admissions procedures.”).
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essentially that they have been discriminated against in the past.
In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that barred gays and lesbians from securing protection under local antidiscrimination ordinances.191 Such an exclusion of a group from the ordinary play of politics was
“unprecedented in our jurisprudence,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “a
denial of equal protection . . . in the most literal sense” and “inexplicable by anything but animus.”192 Some of that may be true, but
not the unprecedented part. This prohibition on using the political
process to gain advantage is exactly what current equal protection
jurisprudence does to racial minorities.
The argument that the Equal Protection Clause cannot make
some people more equal than others alludes to Animal Farm,193 but
it is the Court’s current jurisprudence that is truly Orwellian. It
makes sense neither as operative proposition nor as decision rule,
and it is hardly surprising that the consequence has been subterfuge: the unusually enervated form of strict scrutiny employed by
by the Grutter majority.194 Subterfuge is the natural response to
doctrine that appears to direct the wrong outcome, and if doctrine
has changed from a shield for politically weak groups to a barrier
that stops majorities from accepting disadvantage in order to promote racial equality, it will continue to generate results that seem
unjust under the Equal Protection Clause.
3. Congressional Enforcement Powers
The key question with respect to congressional enforcement
powers is how courts are to determine the existence of a constitutional violation that the enforcement powers may be deployed to
remedy or deter. The early cases reflect the understanding that,
like the existence of the substantial effect on interstate commerce
required for exercises of the commerce power, the existence of
such a constitutional violation is a determination for Congress in
the first instance, with deferential review by the Court.195 More191

517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
Id. at 632, 633.
193
George Orwell, Animal Farm (1946).
194
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
195
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“[Section] 5 is a positive
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determin192
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over, in making that determination, Congress was allowed to deploy its own institutional competence and was not bound by the
rules of administration that restrained judicial review. From the
decision rules perspective, this meant that Congress was allowed to
legislate in response to violations of operative propositions, not
merely decision rules. That is, Congress could identify as unconstitutional practices that the Court would not strike down.196 Again, as
the Court lost sight of the distinction between decision rules and
operative propositions, this understanding collapsed. City of
Boerne v. Flores was the first step.197
In Boerne, the Court considered the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Enacted, as the legislative history candidly
confessed, “to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in [Employment Division v.] Smith,”198 RFRA sought to restore the test of
Sherbert v. Verner.199
Whether RFRA was appropriate enforcement legislation thus
turned on the relationship between Smith and Sherbert, or rather,
on the nature of the free exercise right. If free exercise is a fundamental right, which the Court decided for institutional reasons to
underenforce in Smith, then RFRA was simply an instance of Congress legislating to the full extent of the operative proposition,
something the earlier cases had suggested was plainly within its
power. If, however, free exercise is only a right against laws that
target religious belief, which the Court overenforced in Sherbert,
then RFRA adopted such a broadly prophylactic rule that it might
well seem to pass the bounds of appropriate legislation.
Boerne took the latter view, but it spent no time discussing the
ing whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
196
Morgan is difficult to read, but that this is what Justice Brennan was thinking
when he wrote the opinion can be gleaned from his opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell. 400
U.S. 112, 246 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“But
there is no reason for us to decide whether, in a proper case, we would be compelled
to hold this restriction a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For as our decisions
have long made clear, the question we face today is not one of judicial power under
the Equal Protection Clause. The question is the scope of congressional power under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
197
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
198
S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 12 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1902.
199
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000) (citing to
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
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relationship between the operative free exercise proposition and
the different decision rules of Smith and Sherbert. Instead, it
seemed to take for granted that Smith, as the Court’s latest word
on the subject, set out precisely the scope of the free exercise right.
State regulations that would survive the Smith test, it assumed,
were necessarily constitutional. The question on which the Court
focused was whether RFRA was “congruent and proportional” to
the rule of Smith, not to the free exercise right itself.200
This does not make the outcome in Boerne wrong. Whether one
thinks the decision correct turns largely on one’s theory of the Free
Exercise Clause, and those who believe that it is a merely a right
against targeting (the rule of Smith) tend to find Boerne correct,
regardless of their views on the proper scope of the Section Five
power. Professor Larry Sager believes that Congress can legislate
to the full scope of underenforced rights but argues that Smith accurately depicts the free exercise operative proposition and that
RFRA’s prophylaxis was too broad.201 On the other side, Professor
Michael McConnell shares an expansive view of the Section Five
power,202 but criticizes Boerne on the grounds that Smith is an
underenforcing rule:
[T]he Smith decision was based not on what “free exercise of religion” means (either historically or normatively), but on the institutional point that “democratic government,” despite its admitted inability to accord full and equal accommodation to all
religious denominations, is to be “preferred” to a system in
which courts make highly subjective and intrusive judgments that
200
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (observing that “[l]aws valid under Smith would fall
under RFRA without regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing
free exercise”).
201
See Lawrence G. Sager, Congress as Partner/Congress as Adversary, 22 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 85, 85–86, 89 (1998) (“RFRA requires the Supreme Court to act as
though constitutional religious liberty has a radically different shape than the Court
justifiably believes it to have.”); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores,
1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 83 (1998) (“Where the Constitution’s objective was to protect
religious believers against unfair imposition of special disadvantages, RFRA privileged religious believers in a way that was both normatively unattractive and practically unworkable.”).
202
McConnell, supra note 33, at 171 (suggesting that “Congress may be seen as having some degree of authority to determine for itself what the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment mean”).
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“weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of
203
all religious beliefs.”

The tendency to equate constitutional meaning with judicial decisions, suggested in Boerne, came to full flower a few years later in
cases involving the application of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) and Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) to the states. In Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett204 and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,205 the
Court struck down these applications, making clear that it was
measuring Congress’s enforcement power against its decision rules.
The operative proposition behind the Equal Protection Clause,
which Congress claimed to be enforcing, prohibits invidious discrimination, and in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court had stated
explicitly that Section Five legislation was justified if Congress reasonably found a particular practice invidious. But Garrett and Kimel focused not on invidiousness but on irrationality, what would
be required for the Court to strike down discrimination on nonsuspect categories such as age and disability.
Kimel began with the premise that “[s]tates may discriminate on
the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if
the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest” and went on to measure the ADEA “against the rational basis standard of our equal protection jurisprudence.”206 Because the Act “prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional
under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard,” the
Court found that it crossed the boundary from enforcement legislation to an impermissible “attempt to substantively redefine the
States’ legal obligations.”207
Garrett offers an even sharper display of the unthinking equation
of constitutionality with the outcome of adjudication. The opinion
203

Id. at 156 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)); see also
Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1, 59
(1993) (“Smith indicates that it is a decision about institutional arrangements more
than about substantive merits.”).
204
531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
205
528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
206
Id. at 83, 87.
207
Id. at 86, 88.
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comes very close to saying that invidious discrimination against the
disabled is constitutionally acceptable. Though negative attitudes
and fear, the Court observed, “may often accompany irrational
(and therefore unconstitutional) discrimination, their presence
alone does not a constitutional violation make.”208 After demanding
that Congress find irrationality as a predicate for the exercise of its
enforcement power, the Court assessed the congruence and proportionality of the ADA by comparing it to adjudication, right
down to the allocation of the burden of proof.209
Justice Breyer’s dissent made the obvious reply that by using the
rational basis test as the standard of constitutionality, the majority
had adopted the wrong yardstick: “[N]either the ‘burden of proof’
that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable to
judges applies to Congress when it exercises its [Section Five]
power.”210 Justice Breyer also suggested that Congress should be
required only to find invidious (rather than irrational) discrimination.211 My purpose here is not simply to repeat that observation
but to locate Garrett and Kimel within a larger jurisprudential
trend. Repeatedly, the Court has come to treat its decision rules as
if they were operative propositions, and repeatedly the confusion

208

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367; see also id. at 370 (“‘[A]dverse, disparate treatment’ often does not amount to a constitutional violation where rational-basis scrutiny applies.”).
209
Id. at 372.
210
Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer went on to argue that “[t]here is
simply no reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant to the exercise of its § 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions that reflect a court’s institutional limitations” and followed with an analysis of differing judicial and legislative
competencies. Id. at 384–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211
Id. at 377–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting support in the legislative record for
“Congress’ finding that the adverse treatment of persons with disabilities was often
arbitrary or invidious”). Academics have amplified the point, notably Professors
Robert Post and Reva Siegel, in a series of excellent articles. See Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions
on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1, 8–11 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People]; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel,
110 Yale L.J. 441, 464–65 (2000). Professors Post and Siegel are not working entirely
within the decision rules perspective, however, as they seem to believe that their position requires granting Congress “equal interpretive authority” with respect to the content of the Constitution’s operative propositions. See Post & Siegel, supra note 125, at
1947.

ROOSEVELT_BOOK

1712

10/27/2005 6:18 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1649

has warped the doctrine.212
In each of the contexts I have discussed, the Court began with a
principle that seemed unassailable. Of course, one might think, the
commerce power cannot be entirely unbounded. Of course, the
Equal Protection Clause cannot offer some groups more equal protection than others. And, of course, Congress cannot change the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These are all plausible principles, if not necessarily as incontrovertible as the Court supposed. But they are principles relating to
constitutional operative propositions, not to decision rules. It might
well be the case that the Constitution leaves the job of determining
whether the commerce power has been exceeded primarily with
Congress. It might be the case—indeed, it almost certainly is—that
laws burdening politically powerful groups are less likely than
those burdening weak groups to be the product of legislative hostility or indifference. And it might be that congressional judgment as
to whether a particular practice is invidious is sensibly reviewed in
light of the institutional competence of Congress, and not as
though Congress were a litigant or an inferior court. Distinguishing
212
The current § 5 jurisprudence also seems on the way to subterfuge. In the two
most recent cases, the Court upheld enforcement legislation as valid. Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (upholding Title II of the ADA as applied to cases
implicating access to the courts); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
740 (2003) (upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act). Lane may be reconciled
with Garrett and Kimel on the grounds that the law at issue addressed discrimination
“implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,” making it easier for Congress to establish a violation of the Court’s decision rules sufficient to trigger the enforcement power under Garrett and Kimel. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34. Hibbs is harder,
for Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion suggests that the equal protection violation
the FMLA sought to avert was simply disparate impact. 538 U.S. at 732. An employer
practice of offering leave only to women would be a clear equal protection violation
of the sort Justice Ginsburg made her early career attacking: While superficially benefiting women, it would hamper their participation in the economy by making them
less attractive employees. See id. at 736 (noting that practice of offering leave only to
women “created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue
to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical
views about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees”); cf.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637–39 (1975) (striking down Social Security
provision that granted benefits to widows, but not widowers, with minor children in
their care). But Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to note that federally mandated
minimum leave was appropriate because sex-neutral but inadequate leave policies
“would exclude far more women than men from the workplace.” Hibbs, 538 U.S. at
738. That sort of disparate impact would not violate the equal protection decision
rules.
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between decision rules and operative propositions does not require
any of these approaches, but it discloses possibilities that seem to
have vanished from the Court’s sight.
B. Articulation of Erroneous Norms
A second problem arises when the Court equates the meaning of
the Constitution with the outcome of constitutional cases: Such
pronouncements create a misleading impression of the Constitution. When the Court treats its decision rules as operative propositions, it announces as constitutional truths rules that should neither
be followed by nonjudicial actors nor internalized by the general
public.213 The Constitution does not say that invidious discrimination against the disabled is perfectly acceptable; it is not that callous. It does not say that intrastate noncommercial activity indirectly harming interstate commerce is beyond congressional
regulation; it is not that formalistic. And it does not say that the
majority may accept burdens in order to favor virtually any group
except those that have historically been the targets of discrimination; it is not that perverse.214
This is not to say that the decision rules echoed in the preceding
paragraph are mistaken, though I believe they are. It is to say that
they require explanation and defense. Simply to announce them as
operative propositions gives an impoverished and unattractive view
of the Constitution and the Court alike. Some of the pronouncements about race sound as ridiculous now as the embrace of a formal contractual equality did a hundred years ago. The suggestion
that strict scrutiny for affirmative action helps prevent the intern-

213

Cf. Amar, supra note 16, at 27 (“Even worse than doctrine’s regular sterility is its
recurrent perversity.”). The problem here is in some ways the same one discussed by
Professor Dan-Cohen: When the Court recites a decision rule as an operative proposition, it frequently “conveys . . . a normative message that opposes or detracts from the
power” of the operative proposition. Dan-Cohen, supra note 21, at 632. It is to overcome this problem that Dan-Cohen invokes the idea of acoustic separation in his
thought experiment and then points to the possibility of selective transmission as its
real-world analog. See id. at 634–36 (describing “strategies of selective transmission”).
214
See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420,
433–34 (1988) (“To pretend . . . that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as the
issue in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present doesn’t
exist.”).
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ment of racial minorities215 is a bad joke; Fred Korematsu did not
receive admissions preferences to a concentration camp. More
generally, the repeated assertion that equal protection means excluding racial minorities from the benefits of interest group politics
is much the same cruel charade as protecting the liberty of bakers
to work crushing hours.216 When such rules are trumpeted as the
protectors of equality, the Constitution appears defective and the
Court either delusional or insincere. Describing the Lochner era,
Professor Roscoe Pound wrote, “those decisions wrought an injury
to the courts and to the public regard for law and for constitutional
law in particular.”217
The danger is not just a loss of public confidence in the Court or
the Constitution. For a rather stark illustration of the costs of mistaking decision rules for operative propositions, consider Justice
Thomas’s dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.218 The plurality there held
that the Executive did possess the authority to detain U.S. citizens
who were “enemy combatants,” but that a detained citizen was entitled to some opportunity to argue before a neutral decisionmaker
that he was not, in fact, an enemy combatant.219 Justice Thomas,
dissenting, agreed on the constitutional operative proposition: The
Executive may detain enemy combatants, but not loyal citizens.
The factual determination as to whether a given individual was in
fact an enemy combatant, however, he would have left to the good
faith of the Executive, on the grounds that courts “lack the relevant information and expertise” to review an executive determination.220
Justice Thomas’s decision rule is thus that the Executive may detain anyone it pleases. Courts will not interfere; any challenge to a
215
See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (“Any retreat from
the most searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurring in the future.”).
216
Just as the Lochner Court’s understanding of liberty of contract suggested that a
maximum hours law violated the rights of workers as well as employers, Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52–53 (1905), the Court’s current anti-classification approach
to equal protection suggests that if classifications themselves constitute the injury, affirmative action programs violate the rights of their beneficiaries. Indeed, it has said
as much in the voting rights context. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993).
217
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L.J. 454, 487 (1909).
218
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2674 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219
Id. at 2635 (majority opinion).
220
Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

ROOSEVELT_BOOK

2005]

10/27/2005 6:18 PM

Constitutional Calcification

1715

detention will be dismissed. Like the plurality, I find this an unappealing decision rule—it defers to the Executive on a factual question courts seem quite capable of answering, and in a context in
which the Executive has proven itself untrustworthy in the past.221
But it need not lead to constitutional violations unless the Executive errs in its determination of enemy combatant status. That determination is committed to the executive branch, but it is one that
the Constitution requires the Executive to make in good faith.
Now imagine that the Court comes to understand Justice Thomas’s decision rule as an operative proposition: The Constitution
gives the Executive the power to detain whomever it wants, for as
long as it wants. At this point, things have gotten worse. Giving one
branch of government the unreviewable authority to detain
American citizens indefinitely is exactly the sort of threat to individual liberty that the separation of powers is supposed to avert.222
Once we see judicial refusal to review detentions not as a decision
rule underenforcing the operative proposition (that the Executive
may detain enemy combatants and no one else), but as the operative proposition itself, we have lost the idea that there exists a constitutional line that the Executive has an obligation to observe.
Still, even in this world, other branches of government and the
general public might interpret the Constitution to offer greater
protection to individual liberty. The Executive might decline to act
as the Court announces it can; if not, Congress, the states, or the
people might resist.
Now imagine a world in which everyone has internalized this
proposition: The Executive is constitutionally entitled to detain
anyone it wants, for as long as it wants, for any reason whatso-

221
In Korematsu, military authorities relied on a report known to be false, and the
Solicitor General’s office compounded the problem by not sharing with the Court its
own knowledge of the report’s falsity. See Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis,
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417–19 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (No. CR27635 W), reprinted in Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American Internment Cases 137–51 (Peter Irons ed., 1989). The Justices’ awareness of this historical precedent doubtless affected the degree of deference they were willing to grant
the Executive in Hamdi.
222
See Douglas Laycock, Federalism as a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 67, 72 (1998) (“[A]ll three branches must at least acquiesce for a serious
violation of constitutional liberty to proceed.”).
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ever.223 That is a police state, precisely the sort of thing that we say
cannot happen here. And it probably will not. The example is hyperbolic; the Hamdi Court commendably refused to take even the
first step down this road. But I hope it illustrates the distortions
that occur when the Court announces decision rules as operative
propositions, and the worse harms that follow when others believe
it.
C. Judicial Sovereignty
One of the virtues of the decision rules perspective is that it allows us to see how judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation can coexist with fairly robust forms of departmentalism or
popular constitutionalism. Under the pre-Lopez Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, the question of whether a given activity substantially
affected interstate commerce was left to Congress in the first instance with deferential judicial review.224 Under the approach to
equal protection adopted in cases such as Frontiero v. Richardson,
the Court gave weight to congressional determinations that particular forms of discrimination were invidious.225 In each case, the
Court remained the master of the meaning of the Constitution, but
the Court’s decision rules granted substantial power to other actors, either by allocating primary decisionmaking authority to an
entity other than the Court or by heeding other views in the crafting of decision rules. As Professor Sager put it, the model “depicts
a vision of judicial and legislative cooperation in the molding of
concrete standards through which elusive and complex constitutional norms . . . can come to be applied.”226
If the distinction between decision rules and operative proposi223

In Hamdi, the Executive did assert essentially unreviewable authority to detain
Americans, and one might plausibly ask whether I am not asking readers to imagine
this world. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2639. There is a crucial difference,
however. The Executive was arguing for this proposition as a decision rule—it was
arguing that courts could not second-guess executive determinations that a given individual was an enemy combatant. It was not arguing for the constitutional power to
detain anyone other than enemy combatants. A lack of judicial review would give the
Executive this power as a practical matter, but it would not exist as a constitutional
matter unless the decision rule came to be understood as an operative proposition.
224
See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
225
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973).
226
Sager, supra note 19, at 1240.
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tions is lost, this sort of cooperation seems illegitimate, or defensible only on the grounds that non-judicial actors have independent
authority to interpret the Constitution. Thus, Professors Post and
Siegel argue that “Section [Five] is a structural device that fosters
the democratic legitimacy of our constitutional order. . . . [by linking] the legal interpretations of courts to the constitutional understandings of the American people, as expressed through their chosen representatives.”227 This is quite consistent with a model on
which Congress may legislate to deter or remedy invidious discrimination—conduct that violates the operative proposition underlying the Equal Protection Clause—rather than merely conduct
that violates the Court’s decision rules. Yet Professors Post and
Siegel argue instead for a model that “attributes equal interpretive
authority to Congress and to the Court” so that “Congress does not
violate principles of separation of powers when it enacts Section
[Five] legislation premised on an understanding of the Constitution
that differs from the Court’s.”228 This claim is stronger and far more
controversial. I do not mean to suggest that it is wrong, only that it
is unnecessary to the argument that the views of other branches
should have some weight.229 In the Section Five context, as in all the
doctrinal areas I have considered, the Court may guard its interpretive supremacy with respect to operative propositions as jealously
as it wishes. The possibility for cooperation and dialogue between
the branches still exists as long as the Court understands that decision rules are not the same thing.
When the Court forgets this—when it comes to believe that the
meaning of the Constitution is exhaustively specified by a list of
what judges will uphold or strike down—it denies nonjudicial actors their appropriate role in implementing the Constitution. In
Morrison and Lopez, the Court recoiled from the idea that the
question of whether a law fell within the bounds of the commerce
power might be primarily within the legislative competence.230
Garrett and Kimel similarly anathematized the suggestion that
Congress might find unconstitutional a practice that the Court

227

Post & Siegel, supra note 125, at 1945.
Id. at 1947.
229
For another example, see McConnell, supra note 33, at 171.
230
See supra Section VI.A.1.
228
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would not strike down.231 But in neither case was the issue really
whether the Court would have the last word on the subject. It was
whether the Court would have the only word.
The Court’s reluctance to accept the idea that other branches
might have something useful to say stems in large part from its
supposition that independent interpretation of the Constitution is
the only form such contributions could take. That supposition, of
course, comes directly from the confusion of decision rules and operative propositions, the belief that the Constitution is what the
Court does. It also is driven in part by a fear that Congress does
not take its responsibilities seriously, a fear that to some extent appears justified.232 Judicial deference breeds indifference to the responsibility to make an independent assessment of constitutionality. That is how the substantial effects test led to the unthinking
invocation of the commerce power epitomized by the findings-free
Gun Free School Zones Act.
But judicial contempt will breed indifference as well. If the
Court refuses to pay any attention to the assessments Congress
does make—to the findings of effects on commerce supporting the
Violence Against Women Act or the findings of invidious discrimination supporting the ADA and ADEA—members of Congress
might justifiably wonder why they should bother. If the Court is
concerned that Congress does not take its responsibilities seriously,
the appropriate thing to do would be to adopt deliberation-forcing
rules, deferring to the legislative competency only if some evidence
exists that the competency actually has been employed. The
Court’s current approach is just as likely to deaden the congressional sense of constitutional responsibility.
The same is true of the Court’s relationship to the people. Writing of judicial review generally, Professor Thayer warned of its
power to “dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden
its sense of moral responsibility.”233 Just as Congress might be disheartened by judicial disdain for its attempts to think seriously
about constitutional questions, so too might be the people. A con231

See supra notes 204–12 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 12. For a discussion of the interpretive competency of Congress, see generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 Duke L.J. 1335, 1373–74 (2001).
233
James Bradley Thayer, John Marshall 107 (1901).
232
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gressional decision to leave the Constitution entirely to the Court
is troubling, but a similar popular abdication would be worse.
Dissenting in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, Justice Scalia lamented the popular attempts to influence
judicial opinion. “How upsetting it is,” he wrote, “that so many of
our citizens (good people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this
abortion issue, and on various sides of other issues as well) think
that we Justices should properly take into account their views.”234
Popular sentiment was beside the point, Justice Scalia argued, for
the Supreme Court was, or should be, “doing essentially lawyers’
work” and “ascertaining an objective law.”235
Justice Scalia’s vision of constitutional decisionmaking as ordinary adjudication is not, and has never been, an accurate one. The
Constitution is not ordinary law, created by the government and
entrusted to judges. It is higher law, created by the people, and it
does not belong to courts alone. Constitutional adjudication is shot
through with value choices. Judges are called upon to decide
whether a governmental purpose is legitimate; whether an act is
reasonable, arbitrary, or conscience-shocking; whether a form of
discrimination is justified or invidious. To make these decisions
without reference to current societal understandings—to make
them from the perspective of eternity or 1789—is as impossible as
it is misguided.236 Social movements always have affected the way
that judges view such questions, and there is nothing illegitimate
about it.237 We must not lose sight of the fact that it is not just a
Constitution the Court is expounding. It is our Constitution, and
judges can no more sever its application from popular understandings than they can tell us who we are.

234
505 U.S. 833, 999–1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
235
Id. at 1000.
236
See Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People, supra 211, at 28
(“The Constitution . . . does not live in our society as mere ukase. Disputes about the
Constitution often raise deep questions of social meaning and collective identity that
are not of a kind that a democratic society settles autocratically.”).
237
See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123, 160 (1999) (“With a Constitution made in the name of ‘We the
People,’ all of us are legitimately interested in the meaning of the Constitution—all of
us must be welcome participants in the conversation.”).
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have been critical of some recent decisions. The
main point of the Article, however, is not to argue that particular
decisions are right or wrong. It is to offer a different perspective on
the creation and evolution of constitutional doctrine. That perspective allows for analysis and evaluation of doctrine, but it does not
commit one to any particular view of any particular case. Others
may, as I have said, argue that different operative propositions underlie particular constitutional provisions. Or they may argue that
various factors support the creation of different decision rules than
the ones I endorse. Those are matters about which reasonable
people can differ, as my discussion of Smith and Boerne shows.
The value of the decision rules model is that it allows us to identify a mistake I think no reasonable person should commit: the
conflation of decision rules and operative propositions. No one
should believe that the lack of a judicially enforceable limit means
no limit exists. No one should believe that a decision rule must be
symmetrical merely because an operative proposition is. There are
arguments in favor of judicial enforcement or symmetry, but they
must be given. When we discuss what a particular constitutional
provision is supposed to do or why a particular rule is a good way
to enforce that provision, we are engaged in a discussion that can
be fruitful. When we announce that the substantial effects test is
inconsistent with a government of enumerated powers, or that the
Equal Protection Clause must treat all racial classifications as
equivalent, we are either begging the question or making a category mistake. I believe that the perspective of this Article facilitates fruitful discussions, and I offer my criticisms as the opening
words of such a discussion. I hope and expect that they will not be
the last.

